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RESUMO 
A questão em discussão neste estudo foi sobre a possibilidade de alcançar e manter o emprego 
na economia capitalista. A persistência do desemprego situa-se no coração do mal-estar 
econômico na grande maioria das sociedades modernas. É um fenômeno socioeconômico 
muito complexo, que poderia ser analisado em diferentes níveis. Neste trabalho foi feita uma 
investigação quanto aos aspectos políticos e econômicos do desemprego. No primeiro 
capítulo, o objetivo foi fornecer uma visão geral das explicações teóricas dos fenômenos de 
desemprego em economias capitalistas modernas. Foram propostas as seguintes periodizações 
das teorias de desemprego: a teoria clássica, Revolução de Keynes e a era pós-Segunda 
Guerra Mundial. No segundo capítulo investigaram-se alguns aspectos políticos do pleno 
emprego. Em primeiro lugar, são apresentadas recomendações de política econômica de 
Keynes que foram adotadas pela maioria das nações desenvolvidas após a Segunda Guerra 
Mundial. Em segundo lugar, tentou-se responder à pergunta de por que as políticas 
econômicas keynesianas foram abandonadas pelos países mais desenvolvidos na década de 
1970, apesar de seu aparente sucesso. Conclui-se que o conceito de ciclo de negócios política, 
desenvolvido pelo economista polonês Michał Kalecki oferece pelo menos uma resposta 
parcial a esta pergunta. Para Kalecki, a eliminação do desemprego é perfeitamente possível, 
desde que o governo siga prescrições de Keynes. Este autor afirmou que os limites reais ao 
pleno emprego não são econômicos, mas sim políticos: um governo comprometido com o 
pleno emprego, necessariamente, enfrenta oposição política da comunidade empresarial. No 
terceiro capítulo foi discutido o desenvolvimento de uma relativamente nova escola de 
pensamento econômico que poderia ser considerada como um dos subgrupos da ampla 
corrente de Pós keynesianismo - a Teoria Moderna do Dinheiro e sua principal recomendação 
de política econômica, ou seja, empregador de última instância ou programa de garantia de 
trabalho. 
Palavras-chave: pleno emprego, desemprego, políticas econômicas keynesianas  
    
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The question under discussion in this study was the possibility of achieving and maintaining 
the employment in capitalist economy. Persistent unemployment lies at the heart of economic 
malaise in vast majority of modern societies. It is a very complex socio-economic 
phenomenon that could be analysed on different levels. In my work I choose to investigate 
both political and economic aspects of unemployment. In the first chapter my aim was to 
provide an overview of theoretical explanations of unemployment phenomena in modern 
capitalist economies. I proposed the following periodisation of the theories of unemployment : 
the classical theory, Keynes’s Revolution and the Post–World War II era. In the second 
chapter I investigated some political aspects of full employment. Firstly, I have presented 
Keynes’s economic policy recommendations that were adopted by most of the developed 
nations after World War II. Secondly, I tried to respond to the question why, in spite of their 
apparent success, Keynesian economic policies have been abandoned by most developed 
countries in the 1970s. I have come to the conclusion that the concept of political business 
cycle, developed by the Polish economist Michał Kalecki offers at least a partial response to 
this question. For Kalecki, elimination of unemployment is entirely possible, provided that 
government follows Keynes’s prescriptions. He claimed that real limits to full employment 
are not economical, but rather political: a government committed to full employment will 
necessarily face political opposition of the business community. In the third chapter I 
discussed the development of a relatively new school of economic thought that could be 
considered as one of subgroups of the broad tent of Post Keynesianism – the Modern Money 
Theory and its main economic policy recommendation, i.e. Employer of Last Resort or Job 
Guarantee program. 
Key words: full employment, unemployment, Keynesian economic policies 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is an attempt to address the issue of full employment. My interest concerning this 
subject matter comes from purely practical reasons – I am an active member of the trade 
union movement and the issues of employment and labour market policies are of crucial 
importance to my work. The aim of this work is not to resolve any particular theoretical 
problem – I consider it rather as a learning experience that helped me to better understand the 
complex problem of unemployment. I have decided to analyse the problem of labour market 
from the perspective of political economy because I believe that markets are always 
embedded in social relationships, cultural values, moral concerns, politics, etc… I believe that 
political economy offers us a better understanding of those problems than a purely economic 
perspective, that artificially dissociates the economic and political aspects of labour market. 
 
Of course, I was not trying to downgrade the meaning of the economic science. The first 
chapter of my work can be perceived as a brief sketch of the history of economic thought, 
where I tried to present views of different schools of economic thought on the problem of 
unemployment. Economists have never reached a consensus on the problem of 
unemployment, and their opinions differ radically when it comes to theoretical 
conceptualisation of labour market, identifying the sources of unemployment and factors that 
prevent the economy from reaching the full employment level. 
 
The second chapter deals directly with some political aspects of full employment. I presented 
Keynes’s economic policy recommendation, whose implementation would allow to stimulate 
economy and to achieve and maintain a nearly full employment level in the long run. I also 
evaluated some historical examples of the usage of Keynesian policies in practice. In the last 
section of the chapter I presented the concept of the political business cycle, developed by 
Michał Kalecki and Joan Robinson. 
 
I consider the third chapter of my work as the most important and also the most interesting. It 
presents a relatively new school of economic thought, called the Modern Monetary Theory (or 
Neo-Chartalism) that can be considered as one of the currents of the Post-Keynesian thought. 
The theoretical starting point of the MMT is the nature of fiat money, its creation, circulation 
and destruction in modern capitalist economies. This leads MMT economists to very 
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fascinating and provocative  conclusions about budget deficits, public debts, taxation, and 
fiscal and monetary policies of the state. From the perspective of my work, the MMT 
approach to labour market and their claim that full employment and price stability are not 
mutually exclusive goals of public policy are particularly important. 
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CHAPTER I : ECONOMICS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT 
 
The purpose of the first part of my work is to present different economic theories of labour 
market and explanations of the phenomenon of unemployment.  In order to make this difficult 
matter more comprehensible, I will focus only on those aspects of theories that are relevant to 
the topic of this thesis (i.e. full employment).  
 
Exposition of different theoretical approaches to labour market, contained in this chapter, 
could be organised in different manners : by presentation of their historical evolution, by 
schools of economic thought, by a specific issue, etc… I opted for the mix of the first and 
second approaches. This choice has an advantage of not artificially isolating the economic 
theory from its social, political and historical determinants. That being said, the limited scope 
of this study necessitates focusing only on those thinkers and aspects of their theories that 
could be commonly considered as representatives for their respective school of thoughts. 
 
Given those two considerations I decided to divide this chapter in 3 sections that will deal 
with the classical theory of unemployment, the Keynesian Revolution and theories of labour 
market after World War II. 
 
 
1. THEORY OF UNEMPLOYMENT BEFORE KEYNES 
 
In this section I will present the theoretical approaches towards employment and labour 
markets before the so-called Keynesian Revolution. To be more precise, the period of time 
under investigation here starts with the writings of William Petty (who is considered to be a 
pioneer of the scientific approach towards economy 
1
), and ends with the publication of 
Keynes's magnum opus - The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936.  
 
The choice of this time frame may seem somehow arbitrary - after all, almost three centuries 
separate works of those two thinkers, and one could reasonably question the relevance of such 
periodisation. It could also be reproached that the analysed time period covers ideas and 
theories of such diverse thinkers as Karl Marx, Léon Walras and Alfred Marshall and contains 
                                                          
1
   Alessandro Roncaglia : The Wealth of Ideas: A History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press 
2006, p.53 
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at least one major epistemological paradigm shift
2
 in economic thinking (the so-called 
Marginal Revolution of the 1870s’).  
 
I decided, however, to analyse this whole rich tradition of economic thought in one section 
because from the standpoint of my work the differences between them are insignificant
3
. In 
fact, the theoretical approach towards labour market and explanation of the causes of 
unemployment can be seen as a common denominator between the Classical (before the 
1870s) and the Neoclassical (after the 1870s) Schools of Thought.  
 
I will successively examine here three concepts that can be considered building blocks of the 
Pre-Keynesian theory of labour market : “Invisible hand” of Adam Smith,  “Law of the 
markets” of Jean-Baptiste Say and the marginal theory of income distribution of J.B. Clark. 
 
1.1 ADAM SMITH’S INVISIBLE HAND 
 
Adam Smith (1723 -1790) is considered by many as a father of modern economics. But Smith 
was above all moral philosophers and his economic policy recommendation should be 
perceived as a consequence of his philosophical stance. 
 
The starting point for Smith’s theory is his concept of human nature. He perceives human 
beings as essentially egoist and significantly driven by their self-interest. In a widely cited 
fragment from his “The Wealth of Nations” Smith observes : “It is not from the benevolence 
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and 
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages”4. 
 
What differs Smith’s vision from his predecessors is his moral appraisal of this narrowly self-
interested actor. In earlier philosophical tradition egoistic behaviour was condemned as 
immoral and sinful. For Smith not only there is nothing perverse in such selfish behaviour, 
but rather it should be welcomed as something morally valuable. Adam Smith’s praise for the 
                                                          
2
 In the sense used by Thomas Kuhn in his “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”. 
3
 With a notable example of economists working in the Marxist tradition.  
4
 Adam Smith : “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, Book I, Chapter II : Of the 
Principle which gives Occasion to the Division of Labour, p.26-27 (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981), eds 
Andrew S. Skinner and R.H. Campbell. 
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selfishness was adequately characterized by Jack Weinstein as a “tectonic shift in moral 
prescription”5. 
 
According to Smith, if only individuals could pursue their self-interest unhindered, society as 
a whole would be better-off. To explain this apparent paradox Smith uses a  metaphor of an 
invisible hand of the market : “...every individual necessarily labours to render the annual 
revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the 
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic 
to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in 
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and 
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than 
when he really intends to promote it.
6”. 
 
In Smith’s vision, society is composed of selfish and rational homo economicus maximising 
their material wealth. From this pessimistic presupposition about human nature, he draws very 
optimistic conclusions about prospects of society. The “invisible hand”, that is nothing more 
than a market mechanism, serves as a coordinating mechanism that directs this selfish 
behaviour in such a way that it increases public wealth. As Bernard Mandeville put it, thanks 
to  the invisible hand (“invisible cooperation”) “private vice becomes a public virtue”7. 
 
But the “invisible hand” will lead to increased public wealth and efficient allocation of 
resources (capital, labour and land) only when individuals are not disturbed in their constant 
seek of increased wealth. Therefore, Smith was a fervent opponent of all kinds of 
governments’ interventions in economy: regulations, monopolies, subsidies, etc… The state’s 
role ought to be strictly limited to ensuring public safety, maintaining public institutions and 
enforcement of contracts.  
 
                                                          
5
 Jack Russell Weinstein: “Adam Smith (1723—1790)” in “Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed 
Academic Source”. http://www.iep.utm.edu/ 
6
 Adam Smith: “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, Book IV, chapter II, paragraph 
IX, p.456. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981), eds. Andrew S. Skinner and R.H. Campbell.  
 The metaphore of an invisible hand occurs also in Smith’s other writing – “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”. 
7
 Bernard Mandeville: “The Fable of The Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits”. 
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In conclusion, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor is a first well-developed articulation 
of the idea of a self-adjusting market in the history of economic thought. It also provides firm 
arguments for  laissez-faire economic policy recommendations. 
 
1.2 JEAN BAPTISTE SAY AND THE LAW OF MARKETS 
 
Although the so-called Law of the Markets” was largely accepted by almost all Classical 
economists
8
 (with notable exceptions of Thomas Robert Malthus and Karl Marx), it is today 
most often associated with the name of a French economist and businessman Jean-Baptiste 
Say (1767–1832). 
 
Say’s own formulation of the law (“loi des débouchés” in French) can be found in ”Traité 
d’économie politique”, where he stated that "products are paid for with products9", and in his 
sizeable exchange of letters with Malthus (“Produce opens a vent for produce10”). According 
to William Baumol we can distinguish two main variants of  “Say’s Law” : 
 
 (1) Say’s Identity - “is the assertion that no one ever wants to hold money for any significant 
amount of time, so that, as a result, every offer (supply) of a quantity of goods automatically 
constitutes a demand for a bundle of some other items of equal market value
11.” 
 
(2) Say’s Equality - “admits the possibility of (brief) periods of disequilibrium during which 
the total demand for goods may fall short of the total supply, but maintains that there exist 
reliable equilibrating forces that must soon bring the two together
12.” 
 
Say’s Identity is based on what Paul Davidson called “the neutral money axiom”13- the idea 
that economy works as if it were a barter economy. In this vision the unique function of 
money is to facilitate the exchange between economic agents. Money has an exchange value 
but no utility for itself (“we do not consume money”, as Say puts it) and therefore no rational 
                                                          
8
 Sowell, T. 1994. Classical Economics Reconsidered, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.p.39 
9
 Say, Jean-Baptiste. [1803] 1971. A Treatise on Political Economy: or the Production, Distribution and 
Consumption of Wealth. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, p. 153. 
10
 Say, Jean-Baptiste, Letters to Thomas Robert Malthus on Political Economy and Stagnation of Commerce, 
London, George Harding’s Bookshop, 1936, p.3. 
11
Baumol, W. J. 1977. “Say’s (at Least) Eight Laws, or What Say and James Mill May Really Have Meant,” 
Economica,Vol. 44, No. 174 (May, 1977), pp. 145-161 
12
 Idem. 
13
 Davidson, P. 2002. Financial Markets, Money, and the Real World, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, page 19. 
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agent will decide to hoard it. All kinds of incomes (wages, profits and rents) will be 
immediately spent on purchase of goods and services. I will elaborate this point in the section 
devoted to Keynes’s ideas. 
 
Say’s Equality is a direct consequence of the model of economy where the function of money 
is merely a “neutral veil”, that is as a means of facilitating exchange. If everyone produces 
only in order to exchange his production for someone else’s production, the possibility of a 
slump needs to be ruled out. Market mechanisms will ensure that aggregate supply will 
always equal aggregate demand. 
 
Although Say (and other classical economist) admitted the possibility of overproduction in  a 
particular market, he strongly opposed the idea that there can be a general glut of 
commodities. Steven Keen characterised the Pre-Keynesian economic theory as follows  : 
“[sc. before Keynes] mainstream economics did not believe there were any intractable 
macroeconomic problems. Individual markets might be out of equilibrium at any one time – 
and this could include the market for labour or the market for money – but the overall 
economy, the sum of all those individual markets, was bound to be balanced”14. 
 
The conclusion that we can draw from Say’s law of the markets is that the market economy is 
self-equilibrating (in the long run at least) and recessions (“general glut”) are impossible. For 
instance, in the classical labour market model the possibility of long-term involuntary 
unemployment is excluded. Even when temporary excess of working force occurs, it will be 
brought back to the equilibrium position by the price mechanism. If only workers accepted 
lower wages, the demand and supply for labour would determine the wage rate at which the 
market would be cleared of all excess of labour power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Keen, S. 2001. Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences, Zed Books, London and New 
York., page 210. 
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1.3 JOHN BATES CLARK AND THE MARGINAL THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION 
 
If one would search for the exemplification of the Kuhnian paradigm shifts in the economic 
science, then the early 1870s constitute the perfect case of “replacing one conceptual world 
view by another”. The so-called Marginal Revolution is usually associated with the works of 
William Stanley Jevons (1835 –1882), Carl Menger (1840 –1921), Alfred Marshall (1842-
1924), Léon Walras (1834 –1910) and, to a lesser degree, John Bates Clark (1847 –1938). In 
spite of significant differences in their approaches, those thinkers are considered as precursors 
of the Marginalist theory. By replacing the labour theory of value (LTV) with the subjective 
theory of value (STV) and by introducing the analytical notion of marginal utility, those 
economists radically break with the tradition of classical economics. 
 
In this section I will take a closer look at the work of J.B Clark, and to be more specific, at his 
“marginal productivity theory of distribution”, since it constitutes to this day (however in a 
much more rigorously mathematical form) a fundament of the neoclassical labour market 
model. 
 
J.B Clark presented his view on income distribution in a most developed way, in his work 
“The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits”. Clark’s aim was to 
explain firms’ labour-hiring decisions and prices of the input. Simply put, the marginal theory 
of distribution states that an owner of any factor of production (i.e. input = capital, labour and 
land) receives income that is equal to his marginal product.  
 
Clark starts with the assumption of interchangeability of the factors of production, which 
means  that they can be substituted for another
15
. According to Clark we can measure the 
marginal product of labour (MPL) by determining the increase in the total output of the firm 
by hiring one additional worker and by holding other factors of production constant. 
 
Under the assumption in a perfectly competitive labour market we will observe diminishing 
marginal productivity of each additional worker – each newly employed worker will add to 
production less than his predecessor. Now if we multiply the marginal product of labour by 
                                                          
15
 Thetheory is based on a number of other assumptions : perfect competition, all factors are identical, 
perfectly mobile, there are no idle resources (full employment), etc.  
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the selling price of the product per unit we will obtain the value of the marginal product of 
labour (VMPL). 
 
As I mentioned before, one of the crucial assumptions in Clarks theory is the perfect 
competition. Among other things it means that firms are price takers, not price makers, which 
in the case of labour market means that a wage rate is determined exogenously. In such 
environment, a cost-minimising firm will hire new workers up to the point when the value of 
marginal product of labour is equal to the wage rate
16
.  
 
 
 
 
                        E        VMPL     
PRICE 
 
 A B  
                                                              WAGE RATE 
                        
 
 
                            C                                         D 
                             LABOUR 
 
From the above graph we can see that VMPL constitutes individual firms’ demand for labour. 
By adding the demands curves of all firms we are able to determine the aggregate demand for 
labour in the whole economy. The rectangle ABCD represents total wages paid by the firm 
(labour hours multiplied by the wage rate), and the triangle ABE represents the residual – that 
is the income of the owner of capital (profit). Because in Clark’s approach factors of 
production are perfectly substitutable, by holding the labour constant we can derive the 
marginal product of capital (MPK).  
 
As we can see in the neoclassical theory, the income distribution is determined solely by the 
productivity: each factor of production is rewarded proportionally to its contribution to the 
                                                          
16
 Workers in a given firm are paid the value of the marginal product of the last worker, not their own. 
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output. As Clark himself put it in the preface to his opus magnum : “It is the purpose of this 
work to show that the distribution of the income of society is controlled by a natural law, and 
that this law, if it worked without friction, would give to every agent of production the amount 
of wealth which that agent creates. (…) So far as it is not obstructed, it assigns to everyone 
what he has specifically created
17”. 
 
In Clark’s theory the level of employment is ultimately decided by the firms’ demand for the 
labour, which is, in turn, determined by the marginal product of labour. If there are no 
external-to-market forces that would set the wage rate on an artificially high level
18
, the 
intersecting downward-sloping demand curve and the upward sloping supply curve for labour 
would determine the market clearing price (equilibrium price). Labour market would be 
cleared, which means that quantity of labour demanded and labour supplied would be 
perfectly equal, and therefore involuntary unemployment would be impossible. 
 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Writings of the economic thinkers discussed above constitute three components of the Pre-
Keynesian theory of labour market, that was later synthesized by Arthur C. Pigou (1877-
1959) in his works “Unemployment” and “The Theory of Unemployment”. 
 
Adam Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand that supposedly guides the behaviour of the 
market participants, provides arguments for the self-equilibrating markets and assures the 
most efficient allocation of resources (especially of labour force). Say’s Law of the market 
guarantees that the “general glut” in the market is impossible because “demand in aggregate 
was made up of supplies in aggregate”19. A potential “glut” (i.e. excess of supply over 
demand) in a market for a particular commodity would be quickly eliminated by the free 
market mechanism. J.B Clark’s marginal theory of income distribution explains the hiring 
decisions of cost-minimising firms: in acompetitive environment firms will hire new workers 
up to the point when the value of the labour marginal product (VMPL) equals the wage rate. If 
                                                          
17
 John Bates Clark : The Distribution of Wealth, New York : Augustus M. Kelly 1965, page 101. 
18
 Like minimum wage legislation, collective bargaining or state demand management measures. 
19
Kates, S. 2002. “Economic Management and the Keynesian Revolution: The Policy Consequences of the 
Disappearance of Say’s Law,” International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics 10.3: 463–479. 
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for some reason the wages are fixed artificially high (i.e. higher than the VMPL), 
unemployment will result. 
 
This approach to the problem of unemployment implies some obvious prescriptions for state 
economic policies. If the forces on the labour market naturally strive to economic equilibrium 
(market clearing wage), then the state’s unique task is to protect this “natural” market 
mechanism from any external factors that could disrupt its functioning. Firstly, the state 
should not intervene between worker and employer in wage negotiations by fixing the 
minimum wage. Secondly, the state should not let the organised labour set wages on the level 
that could limit the employment. This can be achieved, for example, by creating  labor 
relations that do not favour unions and by various “union busting” policies. Lastly, labour law 
should be flexible enough to allow employers to rapidly increase or decrease the level of 
employment according to the current demand for labour. 
 
It should not be a surprise that in this classical framework, the only remedy for the 
unemployment problem was to cut the wages. As Paul Sweezy put it in his review of A. Pigou 
“Theory of Unemployment” : “apart from frictional obstructions unemployment would be 
nonexistent if it were not for the fact that wage-earners habitually stipulate for a rate of 
wages higher than the ‘equilibrium’ level20”. 
 
2. KEYNESIAN  REVOLUTION  
 
Worldwide economic crises that started in 1929 and lasted until the late 1930s (The Great 
Depression) posed a major challenge to traditional economics. Especially the persistent 
unemployment could not be explained in the theoretical framework of the classical orthodoxy. 
For instance, in the United States unemployment rose up to 25% of workforce, oscillated 
around 15 during the whole 1930s and got back to its pre-1929 level only after 1941, when 
the US joined World War 2.  
 
As for the causes of the Great Depression, it is important to notice that there was never a 
scientific consensus among the economists and different theoretical explanations were 
proposed.  
                                                          
20
 Sweezy, P. (1934), “Professor Pigou’s Theory of Unemployment,” The Journal of Political Economy, 42, 6, 
(December), page 807. 
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The economists working in the tradition of Austrian economics developed the so-called  
Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT)
21
, where emphasis is put on the negative 
consequences of keeping the interests rate artificially low for an extended period of time by 
the central bank. Marxist economists put stress on the internal contradictions of the capitalist 
mode of production that are inevitably leading to periodic crises – however, they dissent 
profoundly on the direct trigger of those crises
22
. Irving Fisher in his 1933 article in 
“Econometrica”23 developed the theory of “debt deflation” where he claimed that the main 
cause of the 1929 Depression was the over-indebtness of private sector and an asset bubble, 
fueled by borrowed money. In the context of the 2008 subprime crises there was some revival 
of interest in works of a Post-Keynesian economist - Hyman Minsky and his “Financial 
Instability Hypothesis”24. 
 
By far however, the most intellectually influential was the theory developed by a British 
economist John Maynard Keynes
25
. His ideas, developed in The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money and published in 1936, constituted a major challenge to the 
classical economics theory. Keynes was perfectly aware that his work was standing in a sharp 
contrast with some core beliefs of the economics orthodoxy. In a letter to George Bernard 
Shaw, Keynes wrote : “I believe myself to be writing a book on economic theory which will 
largely revolutionize, not I suppose at once but in the course of the next ten years – the way 
                                                          
21
 The ABCT is not a uniform theory and there are different versions of it . For instance there are quite 
important differences between Ludwig von Mises’s version, as developed in “The Theory of Money and Credit”, 
and Friedrich Hayek’s version elaborated in his “Prices and Production”. 
22
The main Marxist theories of the crises include : the overproduction theory, the profit squeeze theory, the 
underconsumption theory and tendency of falling rate of profit. For the detailed overview of those theories, 
see Shaikh A., “An Introduction to the History of Crisis Theories”, in U.S. Capitalism in crisis, Union for Radical 
Political Economics, New York.  
23
 I. Fisher : "The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions," Econometrica,1933. 1(4), pp. 337–357 
24
 Australian economist Steven Keen is probably the most committed contemporary proponent of Minsky’s FIH. 
25
 Many historians of economic thought claim that a Polish economist Michał Kalecki developed the theory of 
effective demand before Keynes. As Joan Robinson put it : “Michal Kalecki’s claim to priority of publication is 
indisputable. With proper scholarly dignity (which, however, is unfortunately rather rare among scholars) he 
never mentioned this fact. And, indeed, except for the authors concerned, it is not particularly interesting to 
know who first got into print. The interesting thing is that two thinkers, from completely different political and 
intellectual starting points, should come to the same conclusion. For us in Cambridge it was a great comfort.” 
(J. Robinson: "Kalecki and Keynes". Problems of Economic Dynamics and Planning: Essays in Honour of Michal 
Kalecki.  Polish Scientific Publishers, 1966, p. 337) 
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the world thinks about economic problems … I don't merely hope what I say, in my own mind 
I'm quite sure"
26
. 
 
According to professors David Colander and Harry H. Landreth we can distinguish three 
components in the so-called Keynesian Revolution : the revolution in economic policy, the 
revolution in textbooks and the revolution in economic theory
27
. I will discuss some aspects of 
the economic policies inspired by Keynes in the second part of my work. In the following 
sections I will deal with Keynes’s major contributions to economic theory. The issue of the 
“revolution in economics textbooks” will be briefly presented in the end of this chapter. 
 
Keynes’s analysis developed in the “General Theory” was intended first and foremost to     
analyse the reasons for the periodic depressions in capitalist economy. Keynes’s aim was to 
deliver a coherent theoretical explanation for the prolonged periods of massive unemployment 
and idle productive capacities in a supposedly self-adjusting market. Let us take a closer look 
at conceptual building blocks of his analysis. 
 
2.1 KEYNESIAN UNCERTAINTY  
 
We saw earlier that the entry point of Adam Smith’s theory is his particular vision of  human 
nature. Smith’s homo oeconomicus ("economic man”) is a self-interested, perfectly rational 
individual driven solely by his hedonistic calculus and looking after their own well-being. 
Later economists delivered highly sophisticated mathematical models based on this 
assumption and the mainstream economic theory today
28
 is built upon this premise about 
micro-level behaviour (microfoundations). 
 
For the concept of a rational and utility-maximasing individual to have any explanatory 
power, it needs an auxiliary assumption of perfect information. For the agents to make a 
rational choice, they need all the relevant information about possible choices and the 
consequences of those choices. Without this assumption, individuals will not be able to 
calculate, what the most “rational” thing to do is.  
                                                          
26
  Keynes, J.M (1973). Donald Moggeridge, ed. The Collected Writings of J. M. Keynes XIV. London: Macmillan 
for the Royal Economic Society. pp. 492–493. 
27
Colander, David C.; Landreth, Harry H. The Coming of Keynesianism to America: Conversation With the 
Founders of Keynesian Economics, 1997  Edward Elgar Pub.p. 137 
28
 Like the neoclassical „Rational choice theory”. 
   14 
 
 
 
 
Keynes was the first economic thinker to deliver devastating critique of those assumptions of 
economic orthodoxy
29
. The crucial concept for Keynes’s theory is the fundamental  
uncertainty that accompanies economic actors in their decision making process. He carefully 
distinguished between economic risk (that is measurable) and uncertainty (that we can’t 
measure)
30
. By risk Keynes meant the situations in which numerical value can be assigned to 
various possible outcomes. In the case of fundamental uncertainty, the economic agents are 
not able to calculate the probability of the future events.  
 
This distinction between risk and uncertainty is so important for Keynes’s theory that I found 
it useful to quote him at length : “By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean 
merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of 
roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond 
being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is 
only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the 
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty 
years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealthowners 
in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever
31
. 
 
Let us note that in this passage Keynes not only defines uncertainty, but also introduces the 
concept of degrees of uncertainty - the weather is only moderately uncertain as opposed to the 
prospect of a European war. For instance J. Barkley Rosser claims that we can distinguish 
four degrees of uncertainty: 
 
“(i) ... there are no probabilities at all (fundamental uncertainty), 
(ii) ... there may be some partial ordering of probable events but no cardinal numbers can be 
placed on them, 
                                                          
29
 But not the last one. Herbert A. Simon, American economist and psychologist, also criticises neoclassical 
theories of “rational” decision-making. He developed the theory of “bounded rationality” that today is the 
central theme in the field of behavioural economics. A similar theory, independently of Keynes, was developed 
by an American economist Frank Knight (Knight, F. H. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston) 
30
 The distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty” was first introduced in his “A Treatise on Probability” (1921) 
and later developed in “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” (1936).  
31
 Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 51 (1937), p. 213-214. 
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(iii) ... there may be numbers but they cannot be discovered for some reason, and 
(iv) ... there may be numbers but they are difficult to discover”32. 
 
Partisans of this approach claim that the concept of degree of uncertainty is an important 
element in the Post-Keynesian theory of the decision making
33
. However, not all followers of 
Keynes recognise the need to distinguish degrees of uncertainty
34
.  
 
Independently of the result of this discussion, the fact that uncertainty is the core of Keynes’s 
theory is undeniable. As Hyman Minsky wrote, “Keynes without uncertainty is something like 
Hamlet without the Prince
35”. But economic actors, primarily investors, need to make 
decisions even when they are facing the fundamental uncertainty. Humans are driven by 
animal spirits, that is a “spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction”. 
 
In order to cope with the uncertainty, economic agents developed a series of conventions that 
help them to make the decisions even without all the necessary information about the possible 
outcomes of their actions. Those conventions are a sort of heuristic techniques or rules of 
thumb that are used to manage the fundamental uncertainty. Keynes himself enumerates three 
such conventions : 
 
“(1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than a candid 
examination of past experiences would show it to have been hitherto. In other words we 
largely ignore the prospect of future changes about the actual character of which we know 
nothing. 
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the character of 
existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, so that we can accept it 
as such unless and until something new and relevant comes in to the picture. 
                                                          
32
 Barkley Rosser, J. 2001. “Alternative Keynesian and Post Keynesian Perspectives on Uncertainty and 
Expectations,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 23.4: 545–566. 
33
 Crocco, M. 2002. “The Concept of Degrees of Uncertainty in Keynes, Shackle, and Davidson,” Nova Economia 
12.2: 11–28. 
34
 Advocates of this interpretation include D. Dequech (“Uncertainty in a Strong Sense: Meaning and Sources,” 
Economic Issues 2.2: 21–43) and J. Runde. (“Keynesian uncertainty and the weight of arguments,” Economics 
and Philosophy 6.2: 275–292). On the other hand Paul Davidson does not recognise degrees of uncertainty 
(DAVIDSON, P. Uncertainty in Economics. In: DOW, S.;HILLARD, J. (Eds.) Keynes, knowledge and uncertainty. 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995. p. 77-106) 
35
 Minsky, Hyman P. John Maynard Keynes. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.P.57 
   16 
 
 
 
(3) Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavour to fall back on the 
judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. That is, we endeavour to 
conform with the behaviour of the majority on average. The psychology of a society of 
individuals each of whom is endeavouring to copy the others leads to what we may strictly 
term a conventional judgment.
36” 
 
Conventions, of course, do not eliminate uncertainty but help to reduce it – here we can see 
the usefulness of the concept of degrees of uncertainty. If that is the case, the investment 
decisions of the firms are necessarily based on their subjective expectations about many 
futures variables : the general state of the national economy, prices of commodities, consumer 
preferences, etc… In other words, there is a necessary speculative element in firms’ decision 
making process. 
 
In Keynesian economics the expectations are subjective and not ‘rational’ in the sense that 
they depend much more on an individual’s psychology than on their rational calculations. 
This explains why the capitalist economies are marked by intersecting of booms and busts – 
periods of prolonged pessimism are followed by investors overconfidence about profitability 
of their actions. Investment decisions are volatile because they are not based on cold, rational 
calculations, but rather on mass psychology of investors. 
 
2.2 KEYNES’S CRITIQUE OF SAY’S LAW  
 
The concept of fundamental uncertainty plays an important role in Keynes’s critique of Say’s 
law of the market. We saw earlier in the section 1.2 that Say (and most of the classical and 
neoclassical economists with him) analysed the functioning capitalist economy as if it was a 
barter economy. In this vision a supply of goods and services equals the demand for those 
goods and services. Say admitted a possibility of glut in a particular market, but for an 
economy as a whole total production would always equal total income. The only role of 
money is to overcome the difficulties of direct barter and facilitate the exchange between 
producers and consumers. 
 
                                                          
36
 Keynes, John Maynard (1937) The General Theory of Employment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 51, 
Nº 02.P. 114. 
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Keynes developed what he himself called a “monetary theory of production”37, where money 
is not just a “natural veil”, but where it plays a very explicit role. He maintained that by 
assuming the “neutrality of money”, the classical economists are unable to deliver a 
satisfactory explanation of the persistent unemployment and recurring economic crises (“it 
has assumed away the very matter under investigation”38).  
 
For Keynes a real-life capitalist economy ( i.e. monetary economy) is one where “money 
plays a part of its own and affects motives and decisions and is, in short, one of operative 
factors in the situation, so that the course of events cannot be predicted, either in the long 
period or in the short, without a knowledge of the behavior of money between the first state 
and the last
39”.  
 
In chapter 13 and 15 of “The General Theory” he identified and discussed three motives for 
which money is demanded : 
 
1. The transaction motive – “the need of cash for current transaction of personal and 
business exchanges”40. This is the amount of money that firms and consumers need   
in order to meet their day-to-day expenses. Keynes distinguished two further sub-
categories of this motive:  income motive (individuals) and business motive (firms). 
The logic behind them is fairly the same – money is demanded in order to bridge the 
times interval between the moment when cash is needed and when it is available. 
 
2. The precautionary motive – “the desire for security as to the future cash equivalent of 
a certain proportion of total resources
41”. Money can be stored by individuals as a 
kind of “emergency fund” that can be used in case of unforeseeable and unexpected 
expenses (unemployment, economic crises, business default, etc…) 
 
3. The speculative motive – “the object of securing profit from knowing better than the 
market what the future will bring forth”.42 Keynes highlights here the desire to keep 
                                                          
37
 Keynes, J.M (1973),  „A monetary theory of production”, in The General Theory and After. Part I, Preparation, 
London: Macmillan, vol. 13 of The collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, p. 408-11. 
38
 Idem. p.410-411 
39
 Idem.p.408-409 
40
 Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, A Harvest Book, 1964, p.170 
41
 Idem. p. 170 
42
 Idem. p. 170 
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money to take advantage of future changes in the rate of interest or bond prices (there 
is an inverse relationship between interest rates and the market value of bonds). To put 
it crudely: “to play the market”. If people expect the future interest rates to be lower 
than the current ones they will buy more bonds (or other securities), and therefore 
reduce their stock of money. If, however, they expect the opposite (the raising of the 
future rates), they will sell the bonds and the demand for money will increase. 
 
The first two motives help individuals to deal with uncertainty. Keynes points out that 
strength of transaction and the precautionary motive depend on the “cheapness and reliability 
of methods of obtaining cash
43”. If it is relatively easy to obtain cash when it is actually 
required (by all kinds of temporary borrowing, for instance), then motives to hold the money 
would be weaker.  
 
At this point we can clearly see the major point of divergence between Keynes and classical 
economists. Because of the three motives enumerated above, economic agents have a liquidity 
preference, i.e. demand for money (considered as liquidity). Money is not only a medium of 
exchange that facilitates the exchange of goods and services. For Keynes and the adherents of 
the Post-Keynesian school of thought money has a utility on its own : “In an uncertain world, 
the possession of money and other nonproducible liquid assets provides utility by protecting 
the holder from fear of being unable to meet future liabilities”44. 
 
One of the key concepts of the classical economics (and Say’s Law) is the so-called Gross 
Substitution Axiom
45
, that is the assumption that any good is a substitute for any other good. 
If the price for one good increases, consumers will buy more of cheaper substitutes and less of 
this expensive good, but in aggregate, the demand will be the same because the same amount 
of money will be spent
46
.   
 
                                                          
43
 Idem. P.196 
44
 Davidson, P. 2003. “Keynes’ General Theory,” in J. E. King, Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA. 229–237. 
45
 Paul Davidson identified three key assumptions of the classical and neoclassical theory :  
(1) the neutral money axiom  
(2) the gross substitution axiom, and 
(3) the ergodic axiom. 
46
 P.Davidson, Keynes and Money in :Arestis P., Sawyer M., A Handbook of Alternative Monetary Economics, 
Edward Elgar, 2006, p.146. 
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However elegant in theory, the gross substitution axiom does not apply to real life monetary 
economy. As Keynes noticed in chapter 17 of “The General Theory”, money (and other liquid 
financial assets
47
) has two special properties : 
 
1. Money has zero or very small elasticity of production - if the liquidity preferences of 
economic agents increase (their demand for money rises), private firms cannot just 
start to “produce” more money (as they would do in case of rising demand for any 
other good). Or as Keynes put it “Money, that is to say, cannot be readily produced;—
labour cannot be turned on at will by entrepreneurs to produce money in increasing 
quantities as its price rises in terms of the wage-unit
48
. 
2. Money has zero or very small elasticity of substitution with producible goods and 
services. In P. Davidson’s formulation it means that “Any increase in demand for 
liquidity (that is, a demand for nonproducible liquid financial assets to be held as a 
store of value), and the resulting changes in relative prices between nonproducible 
liquid assets and the products of industry will not divert this increase in demand for 
nonproducible liquid assets into a demand for producible goods and/or services”49. 
 
To conclude, let us repeat the logic behind Keynes’s repudiation of Say’s Law. Contrary to 
the (neo) classical belief, money is not neutral because it has a utility on its own - protection 
against fundamental uncertainty. In periods of diminished expectations about possibilities of 
profitable investments, wealth owners’ demand for money (their liquidity preference) will 
increase. Money, however, has special properties (zero or small elasticity of substitution and 
production) that invalid the gross substitution axiom and make it invalid in a real life 
monetary economy. The increased liquidity preference will not only not create new jobs (zero 
elasticity of production), but will also decrease demand for producible goods, since hoarded 
money will not be invested in production of producible commodities (goods and services). 
 
2.3  LIQUIDITY – THE PREFERENCE THEORY OF INTERESTS RATES  
 
Keynes rejected the neoclassical theory of interest rate, also known as the loanable-funds 
theory of interest, which was initially  developed by a Swedish economist Knut Wicksell in 
                                                          
47
 Assets have various degrees of liquidity. Money is the most liquid one. 
48
 Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, A Harvest Book, 1964, p.234 
49
 Davidson, P. 2002. Financial Markets, Money, and the Real World, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.P.44 
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his “Interest and Prices” (published in 1898). The loanable funds market relate the individuals 
who want to save (lenders) with firms that want to invest (borrowers). In this theory the 
interest rate is the market clearing price in the loanable funds market. In other words, the rate 
of interest is the price that equates the demand for and supply of loanable funds.  
 
Keynes’s theory of interest rate is a consequence of this vision of the role of money in 
“monetary economy”50. Keynes defines the interest as a “reward for parting with liquidity, 
(…) a measure of the unwillingness of those who possess money to part with their liquid 
control over it”51. The rate of interest is not equalizing the savings and investments (the 
supply and demand of loanable funds) but the stock of cash and the demand for cash. 
 
In section 2.2 we saw that, because of the speculative motive, the demand for money 
(liquidity preference) will increase every time the interest rate falls, and it will decline when 
the interest rate is high (in relation to what is considered by market agents as a “normal” 
interest rate). Given the supply of money constant (determined by the central monetary 
authority
52
), the interest rate can be set at a level where savings excess investments. If these 
situations persist, as they do in periods of pessimistic expectations about possibility of 
profitable investments, the economic system will suffer from insufficient aggregate demand. 
 
2.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVE DEMAND 
 
The culminating point of Keynes’s argumentation in “The General Theory” is his principle of 
effective demand. In short, that principle states that the level of output and employment in 
economy is determined by the aggregate demand. 
 
We can distinguish two components of the aggregate demand, namely the consumption 
demand of households and the investment demands of firms. Investment decisions of firms 
are a more unstable element because they are influenced by expectations regarding 
prospective yields from capital
53
. Expectations, in turn, are not objective and rational, but 
                                                          
50
 In barter economy money is a veil. In monetary economy production starts with money (finance) and ends 
with money (monetary profit). 
51
 Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, A Harvest Book, 1964, p.166-67 
52
 Today’s Post –Keynesians (contrary to Keynes) embrace the endogenous money theory. 
53
 To be more precise, the investment function (or as Keynes calls it, “inducement to invest”) depends on the 
marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) and the rate of interest. MEC, in turn, is determined by the prospective 
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rather subjective and based on crowd psychology of the business community. In other words, 
uncertainty explains why investment decisions of the investors are volatile. 
 
The second component of the aggregate demand, the consumption demand, is a more steady 
element of demand because it is based on habits and customs. For Keynes the spending 
behaviour of households was the function of the level of income. The relationship between the 
change in the level of income and the resulting change is consumption he called “marginal 
propensity to consume” (MPC). The relationship between the change in the level of income 
and the resulting change in saving Keynes called “marginal propensity to save” (MPS). 
 
Keynes formulated the so-called Fundamental Psychological Law (or “Psychological law of 
consumption”) which states that marginal propensity to consume (MPC)54 and “marginal 
propensity to save” (MPS)55 are greater than zero (0) but less than one(1) MPC+MPS = 1. It 
means that every time income of households increases, their consumption spending will 
increase as well but by a smaller amount (conversely, when income decreases, also the 
spending will decrease but by a smaller amount). The higher the income of the given 
household the higher will be its marginal propensity to save. 
 
Given the MPC less than 1, there will be a widening gap between income and consumption of 
the households. In order to sustain proper functioning of circular flow of income and 
expenditures in the economy, this should be filled by investment. But investments, since they 
depend on subjective expectations, are highly volatile.  
 
We saw before that in Keynes’s theoretical framework, the rate of interest equalises the 
supply of and demand for money. Demand for money (liquidity preference) can increase in 
periods of depressed expectation about possibility of profitable investments (both for 
speculative and precautionary motives). As Robert Skidelsky noticed, “Keynes’s novelty was 
to treat saving as a substraction from consumption, but not as a fund for investment”56. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
yields of capital assets, and the supply prices or the replacement costs of these assets. In other words, MEC is 
an expected rate of returns over the cost of buying capital goods 
54
 Marginal propensity to consume (MPC)is equal to ΔC / ΔY, where ΔC is the change in consumption, and ΔY is 
the change in income. 
55
 Marginal propensity to save (MPS) is equal to ΔS / ΔY, where ΔS is the change in saving, and ΔY is the change 
in income. 
56
 Skidelsky R. „Keynes: The Return of the Master”, Public Affairs,2010, p.87. 
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other words, and contrary to the neoclassical belief, saved money is not automatically 
transformed into new investments.  
 
In recession, according to Keynes, the first reaction of firms will not be to lower the prices, 
but to lay off the workers. To put it differently, quantities (number of workers employed), not 
prices (level of wage), will adjust. Although laying off the workers can be seen as rational 
from the point of view of a single firm, this will even further contract the aggregate demand in 
scale of the whole economy. In order to liquidate the excess of supply over the demand firms 
will be forced to continue to lower the level of production. This vicious circle will continue up 
to the point where the economy reaches the point of “unemployment equilibrium”, where 
some amount of labour force and productive capacities of society stays idle. It is worth noting 
that Keynes believed that this “unemployment equilibrium57” was not exceptional, but a rather 
normal state of affairs in modern capitalist economies : “our actual experience … [sc. is] that 
we oscillate, avoiding the gravest extremes of fluctuation in employment and in prices in both 
directions, round an intermediate position appreciably below full employment and 
appreciably above the minimum employment a decline below which would endanger life”58. 
 
Since the term „equilibrium” has a specific meaning in economic science, it is worth noting 
what Keynes actually meant by „unemployment equilibrium”. According to A. 
Asimakopulos:  „All, then, that Keynes means by the statement that the system may settle 
down to a position of “unemployment equilibrium” is that the automatic workings of the 
system will not restore the system to a position of full-employment equilibrium. He does not 
mean “equilibrium” in the usual sense of the term that nothing tends to change in the system’. 
Leijonhufvud also interprets Keynes’s ‘unemployment equilibrium’ as implying the weakness 
of the forces ‘tending to bring the system back to full employment’”59. 
 
When money is hoarded and there is not enough purchasing power injected into the economy 
via investments, the economy will face the problem of excess supply (i.e. insufficient 
demand). The firms will find themselves with stock of unsold commodities and, in order to 
minimise losses, they will have to limit the level of output in the next production period. In 
                                                          
57
 Asimakopulos, A. 1991. Keynes’s General Theory and Accumulation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
P.27 
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 Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, A Harvest Book, 1964, p.229 
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the classical theory, such a situation would simply result in market mechanisms finding a new 
point of equilibrium (with a lower wage rate) between the supply and the demand for labour. 
 
But Keynes rejected this assumption of automatic adjustment  – he claimed that it is a 
fundamental mistake to assume that wages can be reduced without affecting the aggregate 
effective demand : “There is therefore no ground for the belief that a flexible wage policy is 
capable of maintaining a state of continuous full employment; (…) The economic system 
cannot be made self-adjusting along these lines”. Those who think that perfectly flexible 
prices in a particular firm or a particular industry would bring back full employment on the 
level of the whole economy, commit the fallacy of composition - something which is true for 
one segment of the economy is not necessarily true for the economy as a whole. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION: POSSIBILITY OF INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
Mainstream economic models before Keynes did not pay considerable theoretical attention to 
the phenomenon of unemployment. In the theoretical world of classical economists Smith’s 
“invisible hand” assured the most effective distribution of resources, Say’s Law of the market 
guaranteed that there will be no “general glut” in the economy, and the marginal theory of 
distribution “proved” that owners of every factor of production are rewarded proportionally to 
their contribution to production. In this world the problem of unemployment was simply ruled 
out.  
 
Confronted with prolonged periods of unemployment in the 30s, classical economists found 
themselves unable to provide a satisfactory theoretical explanation of why market is not 
adjusting to the point of full employment. In spite of obvious shortages, the classical theory of 
labour market was not abandoned by the economists. After the initial shock, they concluded 
that market is not to blame and agreed that the source of the problem should be searched in 
exogenous factors (such as trade unions and collective bargaining, minimum wage legislation 
and overregulated labour market). 
 
Keynes’s lasting contribution to economic theory was to provide a theoretical explanation of 
the involuntary unemployment (known also as cyclical, deficient-demand, or Keynesian 
unemployment). In “The General Theory” he showed that in monetary economy, where 
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money provides protection against uncertainty, leakages from circular flow of income and 
expenditures are possible. Contrary to Say’s Law, those leakages are not necessarily offset by 
the same amount of “injections”, because investment decisions of firms are based on 
subjective expectations and therefore they are highly volatile. 
 
In Keynes’s view, the market mechanism is not a self-correcting mechanism that can move 
back to full employment equilibrium without some external stimulus. I will consider his 
economic policy recommendation in chapter 2. 
 
3. THEORY OF UNEMPLOYMENT AFTER KEYNES 
 
In this section I will deal with development of the economic theory of labour market after 
publication of Keynes’s “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money”.  
 
In his opus magnum Keynes developed a theory that provided an alternative to the classical 
school of thought explanation of recurrent crises in capitalist economy and prolonged periods 
of unemployment. In “General Theory” he undermined, so far unchallenged, the most 
important dogmas of economic theory, such as Say’s Law of the markets or the assumption of 
neutrality of money. The force of Keynes’s argument and the resonance that his ideas gained 
in political circles, forced professional economists to take a stance towards his theory. In other 
words, after 1936 it was not possible to be an economist without having a clear opinion 
(positive or negative) about Keynes’s theory.  
 
Labelling schools of economic thought is always problematic and it is not easy to draw clear 
lines between them. Being aware of this problem and given the topic of this work, as the 
criterion of classification I adopted their attitude towards Keynes’s theory. In the following 
part of this chapter I will briefly review three schools of thought that can be viewed, 
successively, as a development (Post-Keynesians), radical revision (Neo-Keynesian) and 
fundamental critique of Keynes’s ideas (New Neoclassical synthesis)  
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3.1 POST-KEYNESIANS 
 
The origins of the Post-Keynesian School, of Thought should be searched in the late 30s of 
the 20
th
 century in the Cambridge University. As the most important pioneers of the school I 
should mention Joan Robinson, Geoff Harcourt and Nicholas Kaldor. There has been a 
considerable debate around the question of  affiliation of Michał Kalecki and Pierro Sraffa to 
the Post-Keynesian school
60
.  The prevalent view seems to include Sraffians (Neo-ricardians) 
and Kaleckians as a subgroup into the  “broad tent” of Post Keynesianism, however this issue 
remains controversial
61
. 
 
Post-Keynesian economists consider themselves as true heirs of Keynes and claim that their 
interpretation is the closest to the spirit of “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money”. According to Marc Lavoie, the Post-Keynesian tradition is characterised by the 
following features that allow to clearly distinguish it from both mainstream economic and 
other heterodox schools. First two characteristics should be considered as essential: the 
remaining five as auxiliary and therefore not shared by all Post-Keynesian economists
62
 : 
 
1. The principle of effective demand – states that the level of output and employment 
in economy is demand-determined. Economy is not constrained by supply and 
investments are essentially independent of savings (investment causes savings, not 
the other way around), both in sshort run and in a long run. 
2. Dynamic historical time – Joan Robinson stressed the need to differentiate the 
“logical time” from the “dynamic historical time”63. The mainstream economic 
models reduce time factor only to the logical time (there is only “then” and 
“after”) and compare one point of static equilibrium with another. The Post-
Keynesians emphasise the need to take into consideration the periods of transition 
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(time lags) between two points of equilibrium. By including the historical dynamic 
time, Post-Keynesian models are able to analyse the decision-making process of 
market agents in conditions of fundamental uncertainty and changes in productive 
structure of the economy. In other words, the new long run-position equilibrium is 
necessarily dependent on the short-period position. 
3. Possible destabilising effects of price flexibility - in mainstream economics the 
mechanism of perfectly flexible prices is a device that will bring market for any 
commodity to equilibrium. For instance, hypothetical excess of supply on labour 
market would be instantly eliminated by lowering wages ofworkers. Post-
Keynesians reject the idea that the wage reduction would always have beneficial 
results for the economy. On the contrary, radical wage cuts could plunge economy 
in even more severe recession because of the diminishment of the purchasing 
power of the workers. 
4. The monetary production economy – in section 2 we have already seen that the 
role of money was a key point of Keynes’s critique of Say’s Law and classical 
economics. Post-Keynesians also follow Keynes’s footsteps and replace the 
classical barter-exchange model with a monetary economy model where 
production starts and finishes with money. To use the Marxist terminology, 
economy is not in C-M-C but in M-C-M’ circuit. Accordingly, Post-Keynesian 
economists highlight the role of debt, credit and banks in economic growth and in 
economic recessions.  
5. Fundamental uncertainty –   just like Keynes, Post-Keynesian economists stress 
the difference between risk and fundamental uncertainty. They are particularly 
interested in analysing the decision-making process of market agents in a world of 
uncertainty. 
6. Post-Keynesian microeconomics – dismiss the neoclassical theory of consumer 
choice by rejecting its two fundamental premises: marginalism and decreasing 
marginal utility. Post-Keynesians point out that the so-called Law of Demand rule 
according to which, ceteris paribus, when the price of a good or service increases, 
consumer demand for the good or service will decrease (and vice versa) is 
fundamentally flawed. Firstly, there are categories of goods which simply do not 
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conform to the law of demand, like Giffen goods
64
, Veblen goods
65
 or assets on 
speculative markets. Secondly, the concept of diminishing marginal utility, that 
underlines the law of demand, does not take into account the time factor and the 
change of consumer tastes that can occur when time passes
66
. Lastly, according to 
Steven Keen, by deriving a market demand curve from individual demand curves 
of consumers with “rational preferences”, the neoclassical economists commit 
fallacy of composition. Instead, the theory of consumer choice should be based on 
behavioural perspective and/or bounded rationality
67
. 
7. Pluralistic approach to theorising – the Post-Keynesian theory derives inspiration 
from various thinkers (not necessarily economists), schools of thoughts and social 
sciences. 
This brief overview allows us to agree with Robert Skidelsky’s opinion that “Within the 
academic community, the post-Keynesian school of economists has remained closest to the 
spirit of Keynes’s General Theory”68. Just like Keynes they emphasise the monetary character 
of the economy, the need of taking into account fundamental uncertainty, and reaffirm the 
principle of effective demand.  
 
But Post-Keynesian economists had not limited themselves to defend and to develop  
Keynes’s ideas. In some regards their critique of the neoclassical theory went much further 
than that expressed on the pages of “The General Theory”. As we have seen, Keynes refuted 
Say’s Law and the idea that market is a self-adjusting system (“invisible hand”) but left intact 
the third component of the classical theory of labour market – the marginal theory of income 
distribution. 
  
During the 1960s a theoretical debate between neo-classical economists from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow) and  Post-Keynesians 
and Neo-Ricardian economists from the University of Cambridge (Joan Robinson, Piero 
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Sraffa, Luigi L. Pasinetti) took place – the so-called Capital Debate or Cambridge Capital 
Controversy. A detailed depiction of arguments of both sides is far beyond the scope of this 
work, but for our consideration it is noteworthy that the “Cambridge”69 side of the debate 
demonstrated that neoclassical theories of production and distribution are not sound. 
 
More precisely, the key concepts of these theories, i.e. the production function (equation that 
expresses the relationship between the quantities of productive factors used and the amount of 
product obtained) is deeply flawed. Essentially, those theories are based on assumption of 
measurability of capital, but as Sraffa proved it is impossible to aggregate the capital goods 
(capital goods are heterogeneous), and therefore we cannot determine marginal productivity 
of capital.  
 
As Joan Robinson brilliantly put it: “the production function has been a powerful instrument 
of miseducation. The student of economic theory is taught to write O = f (L,C), where L is a 
quantity of labour, C a quantity of capital and O a rate of output of commodities. He is 
instructed to assume all workers alike, and to measure L in man-hours of labour; he is told 
something about the index-number problem involved in choosing a unit of output; and then he 
is hurried on to the next question, in the hope that he will forget to ask in what units C is 
measured. Before ever he does ask, he has become a professor, and so sloppy habits of 
thought are handed on from one generation to the next”70. 
 
The “Cambridge capital controversy” has a major theoretical implication for the neoclassical 
theory of labour market. If Sraffa’s criticism is sound and we cannot justify the rate of profit 
as reflecting marginal productivity of capital, then we also cannot explain the wage rate as 
reflecting the marginal productivity of labour, since it depends on the quantity of capital in 
use
71
. The whole marginal theory of income distribution that underpinned the neoclassical 
theory of unemployment and labour market seems to collapse. 
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Post-Keynesian economists also assert that labour is not an ordinary commodity, and 
therefore, the traditional tools of neoclassical analysis, i.e. the downward-sloping demand 
curve and the upward-sloping supply curve, are not appropriate to study labour market.  
 
As Steven Keen pointed out, labour is an “inverted commodity” which means that unlike on 
other markets, “supply decisions are made by consumers (households supplying labour), 
whereas labour demand decisions are made by producers (firms hiring labour)
72”. Also, since 
labour force is not produced for profit (unlike other commodities), it is perfectly possible that 
that supply curve in the labour market will “slope backwards”- showing falling supply as 
wages rise (a higher wage means that the  total income will be the same even if somebody 
works fewer hours)
73
. The inverse situation is also possible: a falling wage can in fact increase 
the supply of labour (that will be the case of the household that wants to keep the same 
standard of life in spite of lower wages. In this situation another member of the family would 
have to enter the labour market).  
 
In conclusion, the Post-Keynesian school not only popularised and developed Keynes’s 
theory, but also formulated much more radical critique of the economic orthodoxy vision of 
unemployment, than Keynes did. During the so-called Capital Debates they showed that the 
neoclassical theory of income distribution suffers from fundamental logical inconsistencies. 
But even more fundamentally, Post-Keynesians claim that, given the specific features of the 
labour force as a commodity, traditional tools of microeconomics (supply and the demand 
curve that determine the market clearing price)  are inapplicable to labour market. 
 
3.2 NEO – KEYNESIANS 
 
Immediately after the publication of Keynes’s “The General Theory” in 1936, considerable 
effort wasmade to absorb Keynes’s theory into the neoclassical theoretical framework. Two 
economists can be considered as founding fathers of this approach to economics. In Great 
Britain, John Hicks, already in 1937 published his famous article "Mr Keynes and the 
Classics: A Suggested Interpretation," that was the first attempt to formalise the arguments 
laid down by Keynes in his “The General Theory”. In the US Paul Samuelson was themost 
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important representative of the Neo-Keynesian School of Thought. His influential textbook 
(“Economics”74) is considered to be “canonical” and played a major role in introducing 
Keynes’s theory to American economists. 
 
The Neo-Keynesian economic theory rejected many key ideas from “General Theory” and 
omitted or diluted some of Keynes’s important insights. That was the reason why Joan 
Robinson in 1962 famously called Samuelson and Hick’s interpretation of Keynes’s theory 
“bastard Keynesianism”75. I will point out two reasons that affected this specific “neo-
Keynesian” interpretation: 
 
1. Political - Keynes’s ideas started to penetrate United States academic circles in the late 
1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. The political debate of this period in America 
was marked by the so-called Second Red Scare, that is public campaign of persecution 
and demagogic attacks against people with (allegedly) left-wing sympathies, directed 
by Senator Joseph McCarthy. It is in this context that the first Keynesian textbook  
- “The Elements of Economics”76 by Lorie Tarshis -, in the United States, was 
published. Tarshis’s book gave an excellent summary of Keynes’s General Theory and 
was very close in spirit to the Post-Keynesian school. In spite of very good initial 
reviews, Tarshis’s textbook was withdrawn from the economics departments 
syllabuses very fast, due to "conservative business pressuring" and an organised 
campaign of McCarthy followers. As a result, American universities replaced 
Tarshis’s book with Paul Samuelson’s “Economics” and it was his (Neo-Keynesian) 
interpretation of Keynes’s theory that was presented to the subsequent generation of 
economic students in the US
77. For Davidson, “Paul Samuelson saved the term 
“Keynesian” in economic textbooks from being completely destroyed by the McCarthy 
anticommunist movement at the time. The cost of such saving, however, was to sever 
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the meaning of Keynesian theory in mainstream economic theory from its General 
Theory analytical roots”78. 
 
2. The tendency to interpret Keynes’s theory in the theoretical framework of neoclassical 
economics. The so-called Neoclassical synthesis (the term was coined by Paul 
Samuelson in his 1955 edition of “Economics”) conflates Keynes and the neoclassical 
theory. The Neo-Keynesians, contrary to Keynes, endorse three key-assumptions of 
the neoclassical theory: neutral money, gross substitution and the ergodicity of the 
future. After Hicks and Samuelson’s reinterpretation of The General Theory, there was 
nothing really left from its potentially revolutionary insights. The “neoclassical 
synthesis” became the dominating economic macroeconomic theory both in academic 
and policymakers circles. Contending economic theories were marginalised and “(…) 
Keynes’s revolution was aborted almost as soon as it was conceived79”. 
 
Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics was based on two main analytical tools : the so-called IS-
LM model (Investment and Saving – Liquidity preference and Money supply) and the Philips 
Curve. The IS-LM model was created by John R. Hicks and later developed by another Neo-
Keynesian economist. Hicks’s aim was to make a mathematical summary of Keynes’s 
arguments from “The General Theory” by showing the relationship between real output and 
interest rates and the hypothetical impact of monetary and fiscal policy on macroeconomics. 
The Philips curve was an empirical observation of the inverse relationship between rates of 
unemployment and rates of inflation (i.e. low unemployment was correlated with high 
inflation and vice versa) in national economy
80
. 
 
Both concepts (the IS-LM model and the Philips curve) were important components of the 
theoretical and policy making apparatus of the Neo-Keynesian theory. Hicks and Samuleson 
were successful in an attempt to create a new macroeconomic paradigm which conflates “The 
General Theory” with classical economics.  
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But since they accepted en block all three basic axioms (the neutral money axiom; the ergodic 
axiom, and the gross substitution axiom) of the neoclassical theory, the “Keynesian” 
component of their doctrine was rather weak. There was no place for the fundamental 
uncertainty, subjective expectations and money as a store of value. Accordingly, the 
neoclassical synthesis economists believed that in the long run the market mechanism has a 
tendency to gravitate to the point of equilibrium and full employment. Keynes’s insights 
became only a special case of the classical theory – when the prices are sticky. Just like the 
economist before publication of “The  General Theory” they saw the primary source of 
unemployment in wage rigidities (“sticky wages”) that were set by the collective bargain or 
by the minimum wage legislation. 
 
3.3 NEW-KEYNESIANS AND NEW CLASSICALS 
 
In the 1970s, the Neo-Keynesian theory lost its privileged place in academia and in 
policymakers circles due to its inability to explain the economic phenomenon of stagflation. 
In the face of simultaneous stagnant economic growth, high unemployment and high inflation, 
the traditional Neo-Keynesian policy prescription turns out to be incapable of curing the 
economic malaise.  
 
The failures of macroeconomic management in the beginning of the 70s encouraged the more 
free-market orientated economists to attack the theoretical building block of the Neo-
Keynesian theory. As a result, the “neoclassical synthesis” doctrine was gradually losing its 
importance in favor of the other schools : New Keynesian, New Classical economics, Real 
Business Cycle Theory and Monetarism. Those new theoretical approaches were 
characterised by the determination to purge the macroeconomic from Keynesian components. 
However, in their beginnings there were some important differences in their theoretical 
frameworks, in the advent of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, proponents of those schools 
(especially New Keynesians and New Classicals) reached a new consensus: the so-called New 
Neoclassical Synthesis
81 that today constitutes the mainstream economy. Today the main 
differences between them concern the speed of adjustment of “sticky wages” to the 
equilibrium level, and the effectiveness of the so-called Fiscal Stimulus.    
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In this section I will overview the main theoretical components the of “New neoclassical 
synthesis” and briefly present the main contribution of those new schools of thought to the 
theory of labour market.  
 
3.3.1 MONETARIST SCHOOL AND NON-ACCELERAITING INFLATION RATE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT. 
 
The theory of Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU)  was created by 
Milton Friedman
82
, the intellectual leader of the Chicago School of Economics (Monetarist 
school),  and later developed by one of this students – Edmund Phelps83. 
 
In his 1968 presidential address to the American Economic Association, Milton Friedman 
attacked the central theoretical concept of the so-called Neoclassical synthesis school  – the 
Philips Curve. Neo-Keynesians argued that the Philips Curve is a very useful tool of 
macroeconomic management. By a mix of monetary and fiscal policies governments can 
trade-off lower unemployment for higher inflation (and vice-versa).  
 
But Friedman argued that this apparent compromise is in reality only an illusion. If 
government uses an expansionary monetary policy (i.e. increases the supply of money), this 
will decrease the unemployment and, in line with the quantity theory of money, increase the 
prices. Workers are temporarily mislead by a so-called Money Illusion – they think about 
their wages in nominal and not real terms. In other words, they do not realize that in reality 
their purchasing power decreases due to the higher inflation. In the next period of the wage-
negotiations workers would include the rate of inflation into their wage claims (this is what 
Friedman called the “theory of adaptive expectations”). The unemployment level would 
return to the previous level (determined by real factors like productivity of workers) but 
inflation would remain high.  
 
This level of unemployment Friedman called the “natural rate of unemployment”. It 
supposedly includes frictional and structural unemployment and is consistent with the stable 
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prices. Today most economists prefer to use the term “non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment” (NAIRU)84 to point out that there is nothing natural about its level. 
According to the textbook definition NAIRU is an unemployment rate consistent with a 
constant inflation rate or simply the lowest unemployment rate that can be sustained without 
upwards pressure on inflation
85
. 
 
Friedman and Phelps believed that the Philips curve is downwards sloping in the short-run, 
but in the long-run it is vertical. Their theory has important economic policies implications: 
every attempt to drive the level of unemployment below the NAIRU by an expansionary 
government macroeconomic policy will result in the same level of unemployment but with 
higher level of inflation (given the inflationary expectations included in wage demands of the 
workers). In other words NAIRU delivered a strong argument against state involvement in 
economy. Tools of macroeconomics management, inspired by the Neo-Keynesian theory, 
turned out  to be not only inefficient but also harmful for the economics performance.  
 
In chapter 3 I will discuss the Modern Monetary Theory alternative to NAIRU - that is 
NAIBER (non-accelerating-inflation-buffer employment ratio) inspired by works of Abba 
Lerner and Hyman Minsky. 
 
3.3.2 NEW CLASSICAL SCHOOL 
 
By introducing the NAIRU concept, the adaptive expectations theory and by distinguishing 
the short-run and long-run Philips-curve, Friedman and Phelps shook the fundamentals of the 
so-called Neoclassical synthesis. But economists from the Chicago school (Monetarists) 
admitted that government intervention could be efficient, at least in a short term. In the early 
1970s, works of Robert Lucas, Thomas Sargent and Edward Prescott established a new 
macroeconomic school of thought that carried out even more radical critique of the Neo-
Keynesain theory. 
 
I will highlight two theoretical contributions of this “New Classical school” that were 
intended to purge macroeconomics from its Keynesians elements : 
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1)  Lucas’s Critique – Robert Lucas in his 1976 article challenged the relevance of the Neo-
Keynesian macroeconomics models for policymaking decisions. For Lucas, those models do 
not take into account behaviour of the individuals that will necessarily be influenced by those 
policies. In other words, those models are flawed and misleading because their parameters    
are not policy-invariant. Potential impact of large-scale macroeconometric models is always 
sensitive to policy changes. 
 
Lucas proposed to replace Friedman’s concept of “adaptive expectations” with so-called 
Rational Expectations (a theory based on the works of John Muth). Economic models should 
be based on strong microfoundations, i.e. rules that govern the behaviour of the individual 
agents in the markets. According to Lucas and other New Classical economists, individuals 
are rational and they are making rational decisions about the economy using all the 
information available to them (also information about intended policy measure).  
 
For instance, if market agents anticipate state attempts to boost the effective demand, those 
measures will be inefficient even in a short run. This pessimistic conclusion about 
possibilities of the monetary theory to manage the levels of inflation, output and employment 
was developed later by other New Classicals economists (Tom Sargent and Neil Wallace) and 
is known today as the “policy ineffectiveness proposition”86. 
 
2) Real Business Cycle Theory  (RBC theory) – emerged in early 1980 as an off shot of the 
New Classical School, in order to reconcile the theoretical framework of the general 
equilibrium with recurrent economic fluctuations. In reality, the RBC theory includes 
different models  (the most influential one was developed by Finn Kydland and Edward C. 
Prescott) but they all share some common features. 
 
Just like other New Classical economists, RBC theorists accept the rational expectations 
hypothesis and perfect competition. In this model, economy is assumed to be always at full 
employment level (defined by Friedman as a “natural rate”) and markets are clearing. 
Fluctuations in economy are caused by exogenous shocks, like changes in technology or 
productivity (“real” factors), and reaction of the optimising market actors to them (for 
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instance, by increasing workers’ preference for leisure the supply of labour force in economy 
will decrease). 
 
In the RBC framework the alternating periods of economic growth and recessions were not 
seen as a market failure but as a socially optimal equilibrium response of utility maximising 
firms and households for technological (productivity) shocks. Considering that, RBC theorists 
conclude that no activation policy should be undertaken by the governments. 
 
3.3.3 NEW KEYNESIANS   
 
The New Keynesian school emerged in the 1980s as a response to Monetarist and New 
Classical attacks on the Neo-Keynesian theory (neoclassical synthesis). The most prominent 
economists working in this framework are Joseph E. Stiglitz, Olivier Blanchard, Gregory 
Mankiw and Paul Krugman.  
 
The New Keynesian school focuses their research programs on microeconomic foundations in 
order to explain macroeconomics disequilibrium. They accept the pertinence of Lucas’s 
critique and Friedman’s “natural rate” of unemployment but argue, contrary to New Classical 
economists, that there is no self-equilibrating market mechanism. Economy can stay far below 
the level of full employment for the extended periods of time due to “market imperfections”. 
   
Most of New Keynesians models stress the importance of the nominal rigidities that keep the 
markets from clearing. That means that supply of labour (or other commodities) does not 
adjust instantly to change in demand – the price and wages are “sticky”.  New Keynesian 
research program focuses on explaining the micro foundations of this wage (price) stickiness. 
J. Stiglitz and B. Greenwald in their paper offer survey of theories of wage rigidities in labour 
market
87
  : 
 
1) Efficiency wage theory – proponents of this view claim that it may benefit firms to keep 
wages above the level of workers’ marginal revenue product. According to them, “efficiency 
wages” raise the workers’ motivation and help avoid a situation when workers  do less work 
than it was agreed on/required (“shirk”). Efficiency wage also helps to reduce labour turnover 
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(and therefore the costs of hiring and training of the new worker) and helps to attract workers 
with higher skills. 
 
2) Insider-outsider theory of employment – developed by Assar Lindbeck and Dennis 
Snower
88
. Workers who are already employed (“insiders”) will use their favourable position 
and the fact that firms incur costs of labour turnover to bargain for higher wages, that will 
prevent the firms from increasing the employment. 
 
3) Imperfect competition
89
 – contrary to the New Classical school, New Keynesian models 
reject the assumption of perfect competition. Under imperfect competition some firms are 
price makers (not price takers) and, accordingly, they can use their market power to set and 
maintain their prices above marginal cost. 
 
4) Implicit contract theory – assumes that between worker and employer there is an unwritten, 
mutually beneficial agreement. To a worker it is a guarantee of a nominal wage that is 
independent of their marginal productivity (that is necessary changing on different stages of 
business cycles) that is on average lower than it would be if wage rates changed automatically 
with changed marginal productivity. In other words, workers accept the lower but long-term 
average wage. 
 
The purpose of all those theories is to explain the price stickiness in labour market. Other 
New Keynesian models search to provide explanations for price rigidities in markets for 
commodities. For instance, Gregory Mankiw developed a “menu costs theory” in order to 
explain short-term economic fluctuations. Prices are not perfectly flexible because firms bear 
the cost of adjustment (“menu cost”) and therefore they adjust them periodically rather than 
continuously. 
 
With those microfoundations New Keynesian economists construct macroeconomic models, 
the so-called Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models in Macroeconomics (DSGE). 
Those models are examining the changes in the national economy over time (they are 
“dynamic”), they take into account random variable or variables that could affect economy 
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(they are “stochastic”90) and they search for a set of prices that would result in an overall (or 
"general") equilibrium (i.e. all market would be clear). 
 
Two key assumptions of DSGE models about microfoundations make them supposedly 
Lucas-critique-proof : all agents of the same type are identical (there is a “representative firm” 
and “representative households”) and they all have rational expectations91. According to New 
Keynesians, by summing up decisions of those agents it is possible to establish a set of prices 
that would equalise supply and demand in every market, and therefore DSGE can be a useful 
macroeconometric forecasting model. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
My aim in this chapter was to provide an overview of theoretical explanations of 
unemployment phenomena in modern capitalist economies. Given the abundance of the 
literature on the topic, I could only present a very limited number of the most important ideas 
and theories. Considering the subject of my thesis, I choose one criterion of selectivity: the 
influence that a given theory had for policy makers decisions. In other words, I considered 
only those economic doctrines that (at least to some degree) were implemented by politicians 
that tried to resolve the problem of unemployment.  
 
In the light of these considerations, I proposed the following periodisation of the theories of 
unemployment : the classical theory, Keynes’s Revolution and the Post–World War II era.  
 
Classical economists perceived labour market as any other commodity market and therefore 
had not seen any need for developing the theory of unemployment in any systematic  way. Let 
us point out, however, three theoretical building blocks that were later synthetised by Arthur 
Cecil Pigou into a so-called Classical Theory of Unemployment. Firstly, a view that economy 
has a self-adjusting mechanism (Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”) and if only left alone, it will 
always equilibrate. Secondly, Say’s law of the markets where money is only a device that 
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facilitates the exchange of goods and services. Thirdly, J.B. Clark’s marginal theory of 
income distribution, where owners of each factor of production receive income that is 
proportional to their contribution to production. 
 
Given those assumptions, classical economists argued that unemployment is caused by 
exogenous factors that prevent market from achieving the level of full employment. They 
argued that every “market interference”, like minimum wage legislation or labour union 
activities, will result in excess of supply over demand in the labour market. The classical 
theory of unemployment ruled out the possibility of  “involuntary unemployment” that would 
be a natural consequence of the market mechanism. On the policy recommendation level that 
meant that fully flexible wages would solve the problem of unemployment. 
 
The publication of “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” in 1936 was a 
major paradigm shift in theory of unemployment. Keynes attacked two central concepts of 
classical economy: the belief that market is a self-adjusting mechanism and Say’s law of the 
markets. In Keynes’s theory, market agents are functioning in environment of fundamental 
uncertainty that influences their subjective expectations about profitability of the future 
investment.  
 
In this world money is not only a lubricate of exchange but can also serve as a store of value. 
This, in turn, will cause leakages from the circular flow of income and expenditure that will 
not be offset by investment or extra consumption. As a result, economy as a whole will face a 
problem of insufficient demand that will result in underemployment equilibrium. Persisting 
unemployment will accompany the idle productive forces of society with no tendency towards 
the full employment level. Arguments put forward by Keynes in “The General Theory” 
provided a theoretical explanation of the existence of involuntary unemployment in capitalist 
economies. 
 
In the third section I presented a general line of evolution of the main macroeconomic school 
of thoughts. Taking Keynes’s theory as a point of reference, I argued that we can divided it in 
three groups that respectively developed (Post-Keynesians), radically revised (Neo-
Keynesian) and fundamentally criticized Keynes’s ideas (New Neoclassical Synthesis). 
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Economists from the Post-Keynesian school not only retained all of Keynes’s concepts and 
ideas presented in “The General Theory”, but also creatively developed them. In fact, they 
presented even more radical critique of mainstream economics by showing, in “capital 
debates”, that the neoclassical theory of income distribution is deeply flawed. By doing so, 
Post-Keynesians debunked the third component of the classical theory of unemployment (J.B 
Clark’s marginal theory of income distribution) and accomplished the work started with the 
publication of “The General Theory”. 
 
The Neo-Keynesian school (“Neo-classical synthesis”) was a specific interpretation of 
Keynes’s thought by Paul Samuelson and John Hicks. By rejecting the most important 
concept of Keynes’s theory – i.e. the “fundamental uncertainty” - they effectively reduce 
Keynes’s theory to a special case of the neoclassical theory. Two main analytical tools of the 
Neo-Keynesian school, that is the IS–LM model and the Philips curve, were unable to explain 
the economic phenomena of stagflation that occurred in the 1970s, and therefore they becsme 
vulnerable to theoretical attacks of  the more conservative economists. 
 
Milton Friedman contested the idea that government could exploit the trade-off between the 
rates of inflation and unemployment. Because of adaptive expectations of the economic 
agents expansionary monetary policies would always result in higher inflation with the same 
level of unemployment (“natural rate of unemployment” or NAIRU). The Neo-Keynesian 
school was also criticised by Lucas and the New Classical school for not grounding their 
theory in microeconomics. They introduced and developed concepts of the rational 
expectations of markets agents and the idea that fluctuation in economy is caused by 
technological (productivity) shock. Recessions were caused by optimization strategies of 
individuals for changes in productivity, and therefore no activation policy should be 
undertaken by governments. 
 
The New Classical school shares common features with the New Keynesian school that arose 
in the 90s and was focused on providing the explanation for price “stickiness”. Today the 
New Keynesian school and the New Classical school merged to a large degree and together 
with the Monetarist School and the New Institutionalist School they constitute mainstream 
economics (“new neo-classical synthesis”). 
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The New-neoclassical synthesis in many regards is s return to the Pre-Keynesian vision of 
unemployment. Three assumptions that form the basis of neoclassical economics  : the neutral 
money axiom, the ergodic axiom and the gross substitution axiom rule out the possibility of 
involuntary unemployment. Contrary to Keynes and the Post-Keynesian vision in neoclassical 
framework (assuming that all prices and wages are perfectly flexible) there is no place for 
involuntary (cyclical) unemployment. 
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CHAPTER II: POLITICS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT 
 
In the first part of my dissertation, I presented an overview of economic theories of labour 
markets and unemployment. We saw that the publication of Keynes, “The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money” in 1936 constituted a critical point with regard to the 
previous (neo)classical tradition. In his magnum opus Keynes provided a coherent theoretical 
explanation of involuntary unemployment and undermined the (neo)classical dogma of self-
adjusting market.  
 
Now I will depart from the theoretical consideration and focus on some political implications 
of the ideas previously discussed. Chapter 2 consists of two sections. 
 
The first section deals with economic policies inspired by the Keynesian theory. Keynes not 
only comprehensively challenged the orthodox vision of the labour market on the theoretical 
grounds, but also outlined macroeconomic policies tools that could bring economy back to the 
full employment level. Therefore, in this first section, we will focus on the effectiveness of 
Keynesian counter-cyclical demand management policies. 
 
In the second section, I will discuss the argument put forward by a Polish economist Michał 
Kalecki in his 1943 essay, entitled “Political Aspects of Full Employment”, that limits to full 
employment are not economical, but political. I will also give a brief overview of a changing 
policy attitude towards the problem of unemployment. Immediately after the Second World 
War most of the governments of developed countries were committed to achieving and 
maintaining full employment.  In the 70s focus of policymakers shifted from the full 
employment to the low inflation target. Accordingly, much of the economic policy decisions 
were transferred from governments to the independent central banks. As a consequence of the 
Global Financial Crises of 2008 the problem of unemployment was pushed even lower in the 
hierarchy of macroeconomic goals, in favour of balanced budgets. 
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1.  KEYNES’S ECONOMIC POLICIES RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The essence of Keynes’s message from “The General Theory” can be summed up as follows: 
in capitalism, economy can stabilise at “unemployment equilibrium” (i.e. the existence of 
involuntary unemployment) and there is no automatic market mechanism that could lift the 
economy back to the full employment level. According to Keynes, depressed economy will 
not equilibrate itself and even if it did – the social costs (like long-term unemployment and 
unused productive capacities of societies) of prolonged depressions are simply too high to 
bear (as he once pointed out: “In the long run we are all dead”). 
 
In spite of those market failures and contrary to radical social thinkers and economists of 
Marxist provenance, Keynes (partisan of the Liberal Party) did not advocate the abolishment 
of capitalism. Instead, he proposed a set of economic reforms that, in his opinion, could 
preserve the system. In fact, Keynes’s political philosophy was very conservative and his 
proposals intended to defend the capitalism against its excesses. For Keynes, properly state-
managed market economy could provide stable growth and employment for everyone.  
 
The main deficiencies of unmodified capitalism were summarised by Keynes in the opening 
line of the last chapter of “The General Theory” : “The outstanding faults of the economic 
society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and 
inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes”92. Accordingly, his policy proposals were 
thought as remedies for those problems.  
  
1.1 MONETARY POLICIES  
 
In section 2.4 of the first chapter we saw that Keynes analysed the economy as circular flow 
of income and expenditures between households, firms and governments. When the outflows 
from this flow (“leakages” in the form of savings, taxes and imports) are not offset by the 
simultaneous inflows (“injections” in the form of private investment, government spending 
and exports), the economy will suffer from the deficient demand. This relation can be shown 
in the following equation: 
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Savings + Taxes + Imports = Investment + Government Spending + Exports 
 
For Keynes, governments should provide counter-cyclical demand management by assuring 
that leakages are always counterbalanced by injections. In case of economic slowdown and in 
order to avoid prolonged recessions, government should provide incentives for the private 
sector to invest. This can be achieved by lowering the tax burden (i.e. diminishing the 
outflows), or by encouraging the business owners to invest (i.e. increasing the inflows) by 
lowering the costs of obtaining the credit. 
 
According to Keynes, monetary policy makers should focus on keeping the long-term 
interests rates low. This can be achieved by expansionary monetary policies of the central 
bank: increasing the supply of money in the banking system would cause the interests rates to 
fall. This “policy of cheap money” would, in turn, encourage private firms to take credits and 
to invest. The idea that low, not high, interest rates could boost the private investment was a 
real novum in economic thinking and Keynes’s original contribution. 
 
It is worth pointing out here that neo (classical) economists also recommended to increase the 
supply of money in case of recession. Contrary to Keynes, however, they believed that it was 
a sufficient condition for a recovery. Keynes was more skeptical about the efficiency of 
monetary policies and treated lowering the interest rates only as a sine qua non condition of 
proper anti-crises treatment. 
 
In chapter 15 of “The General Theory” entitled “The Psychological and Business Incentives 
To Liquidity”, Keynes explains why the “policy of cheap money” will not be sufficient to get 
the economy out of the slump: 
 
 “There is the possibility, (…) that, after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain 
level, liquidity-preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost 
everyone prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest. In 
this event the monetary authority would have lost effective control over the rate of 
interest”93.  
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This passage was often considered as Keynes’s description of the so-called Liquidity Trap- a 
situation when injection of money into private banking system by the central bank fails to 
stimulate private investment due to the preference of the private sector for hoarding cash.  
 
The opinion that monetary policy is largely ineffective in a case of severe recession is 
commonly shared by Keynesian economists of all strands (Post-, Neo- and New Keynesians).  
One of the strongest modern day proponents of this idea is Richard Koo who coined the term 
“balance sheet recession”94. According to Koo (who is clearly inspired by Keynes via works 
of Hyman Minsky), balance sheet recession occurs when the private sector (firms and 
households) is collectively focused on saving, rather than investing and spending. Because the 
private sector keeps repaying the debt  (balancing the assets and liabilities) there will be 
nobody to invest.  
 
This is exactly what Keynes meant by the “paradox of thrift : actions that are rational from the 
point of view of the individual entity (saving in order to repay the debt) can have catastrophic 
consequences for the economy as a whole. According to Koo, in such a situation, increasing 
the money supply by the central bank will be ineffective because debt minimisation by the 
private sector will nullify the effectiveness of the monetary policy. 
    
1.2 FISCAL POLICIES 
 
As we recall from the first chapter, in real-world monetary based economy firms function in 
an environment of fundamental uncertainty. If their expectations about prospects of profitable 
investments decrease for any reason, the demand for money of the private sector (its liquidity 
preference) will rise. Circular flow of income and expenditures will be out of balance because 
the “leakages” part (savings of the private sector) will exceed the “injection part” (investment 
of private sector) of the equation. 
 
Because of this “saving glut”, economy will suffer from deficient aggregate demand. 
According to Keynes, in such a situation the only remedy is to stimulate the second 
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component of the “injections” to circular flow, namely the government spending. In the last 
chapter of the “General Theory” he stated: 
 
 “(…) it seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest 
will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, 
therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove 
the only means of securing an approximation to full employment (…)95. 
 
Indeed, the culminating point of Keynes’s argumentation in the “General Theory” is a 
provision of the raison d'être for countercyclical state fiscal policies. According to Keynes, 
the state should step in, significantly increase public spending and, in so doing, close the gap 
between savings and investments (caused by liquidity preference of the private sector). For 
Keynes the ultimate goal of the state intervention was to solve “the real problem, fundamental 
yet essentially simple… [namely] to provide employment for everyone”96. 
 
Keynes recommendation to increase the public expenditures was in sharp contrast with 
prevalent opinion of the time. Orthodox economists that populated British Exchequer in 20s 
and 30s (like Ralph George Hawtrey or Frederick Leith-Ross) defended the view that 
stimulating the economy by public spending will necessarily be ineffective since the it would 
“crowd out” the private spending. Fiscal stimulus would solely transfer the resources between 
private and public sector but would not have any effects on the total level of unemployment or 
output
97
.  
 
In the frequently quoted chapter 24 of the “General Theory” Keynes did not specify what he 
meant exactly by “socialisation of investments”, and consequently this term was a subject of 
controversy. Keynesian policies had often been labelled as quasi-communist (by conservative 
politicians) or social democratic (by social democrats themselves). In order to avoid the 
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erroneous interpretations of Keynes’s ideas, it is necessary to scrutinise the concept of 
socialisation of investment.  
 
In his 1926 pamphlet entitled “The End of Laissez-Faire” (1926), Keynes makes clear what 
his view on the role of state in economy is: “The important thing for government is not to do 
things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but 
to do those things which at present are not done at all.
98" For Keynes, government’s duty is to 
maintain the aggregate demand on the level that would preserve full employment. In order to 
achieve this goal it is not necessary for the state to assume responsibility for all economic 
activities. In 1929, Keynes together with Hubert Henderson wrote “Can Lloyd George Do It? 
An Examination of the Liberal Pledge” where he advocated reducing unemployment by 
programs of public spending. 
 
As we can see, and contrary to assertions of Keynes’s conservative detractors, by 
“socialisation of investments” he did not mean nationalisation of the means of production. He 
was supporting rather different forms of joint venture of public and private sectors or what is 
today called “public-private partnerships”. As he put it himself: “all manner of compromises 
and of devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative. But beyond 
this no obvious case is made out for a system of State Socialism which would embrace most of 
economic life of the community”99. 
 
But it would be equally misleading to portray Keynes as a founding father of the post-war 
European welfare state. As Skidelsky noticed, “Keynes was thinking about the state as an 
investor, not as a consumer”100. He would approve a modest social safety net (family 
allowance and unemployment benefits) but was rather concerned with size and consequent 
financial burden of the Beveridgean project of the welfare state
101
. In light of the broad range 
literature now available, there is no ground for assertion that a big public sector and large 
public expenditures are natural implications of Keynes’s recommendations102. 
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However, that is not to say that Keynesian fiscal policies cannot be used in order to achieve 
the goals valued by left of the political spectrum. Indeed, Keynes’s theory was warmly 
welcomed by the reformist wing of the labour movement, which focused more on rising the 
consumption of the workers than on control of the means of production.  
 
In fact, what Keynes recommended was increased government expenditures in order to 
stimulate aggregate demand. As long as government is spending, the question of composition 
of public investments is secondary for him (“Pyramid-building, earthquakes, even wars may 
serve to increase wealth, if the education of our statesmen on the principles of the classical 
economics stands in the way of anything better”103). In this sense, Keynesian policy 
recommendations are “value free” - meaning that they can be adopted by governments with 
both right and left-wing agenda
104
.  
 
The closest Keynes got to discuss the details of the “socialisation of the investments” was in 
his pamphlets “We can Conquer Unemployment” and “Can Lloyd George do it?: An 
examination of the Liberal pledge” (written together with Hubert Henderson), where he made 
a strong case for big programs of public works in order to decrease unemployment and get the 
British economy out of the slump. In his appraisal of the political program of the Liberal Party 
(then headed by Lloyd George) he wrote: “It is a question of the State putting its hand to the 
job or of its not being done at all. Roads, afforestation, reclamation and drainage, 
electrification, slum clearance and town planning, the development of canals, docks and 
harbours”105. As we can see, although the composition of public investments was not an 
essential element in Keynes’s overall argumentation, he had some preferences : government 
should invest in public infrastructure.  
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The most controversial aspect of Keynes’s proposition was the question of funding 
countercyclical public investment. Since the aim was to increase the total amount of 
investment, government should not rise the tax burden on the private sector (and increase the 
“leakages” from our circular flow of income). Therefore, the only possibility for the 
government was to borrow the money, i.e. the increasing of the deficit spending. Contrary to 
popular belief and some erroneous interpretations that portrayed Keynes as an irresponsible 
deficit spender, he had a rather conservative view on national debt.  
 
Firstly, a careful reading of Keynes's texts shows that he made a clear distinction between 
productive and unproductive debt (or what he called “dead-weight debt”). His proposition was 
to separate investment (capital budget) from consumption expenditures (ordinary budget) of 
the government
106
. According to Keynes, governments should run surpluses in their ordinary 
budget that, in turn, should be “transferred to the capital Budget, thus gradually replacing 
dead-weight debt by productive or semi-productive debt (…)”107. Kregel noticed108, as 
referred by Mario Secarrecia; “(…) chronic operating deficits in the ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ 
budget would instead be a visible sing of a failure on the part of governments to remain 
committed to an active public investment policy of achieving full employment”109. 
 
Secondly, Keynes believed that properly directed public investment would pay for itself in the 
long term. Brown-Collier and Collier pointed out correctly that for Keynes productive 
investments were crucial : “Public investment should consist of those projects that provide a 
real return over time, either in cash returns such as public enterprises, or indirect returns 
such as school buildings
110”. Provided that government invests in profitable (in the sense : 
beneficial for society) projects, “dead-weight debt” should not be an issue. Government 
spending in one budgetary year will provide returns in the following years (for example 
infrastructure). Suitably managed public debt and budget deficits will be  self-liquidating 
problem. 
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Finally, in order “(…) to preserve sound accounting, to measure efficiency, to maintain 
economy and to keep the public properly aware of what things cost
111”, the cost of particular 
public service should be directly connected with the source out of which they are provided. 
Keynes endorsed matching expenditures with benefits they generate
112
 : for instance, 
unemployment benefits should be financed out of social security contributions (of employer 
and worker) and not from taxation of the general population. 
 
Given Keynes’s qualifications to government spending it should be clear that it is not correct 
to portray him, as some conservative critiques do, as “fiscally irresponsible”. It is true that 
Keynes encouraged increased government expenditures in order to offset diminished private 
investment, but he was quite concerned with unproductive debt that could get "out of 
proportion to the growth of the national income"
113
. Consequently, labelling the government 
spending that does not satisfy the above requirements as “Keynesian policies” is questionable. 
 
The last point that needs to be clarified is the exact mechanism by which increased 
government spending would bring back economy to the full employment level. One of 
Keynes’s pupils and his closest collaborator, Richard Kahn, in his famous article from 
1931
114
, developed the concept of “fiscal multiplier” (also known as “Keynesian multiplier”) 
that supposedly measures how government spending stimulates total output and employment. 
 
The Kahn-Keynes multiplier can be defined as a “change in real GDP or other measure of 
output caused by a one-unit increase in a fiscal variable”115. For instance, if one Pound spent 
by the British government cause increase in British GDP of 2 Pounds, the multiplier effect 
would be of a factor of 2.  
 
The theory of multiplier is tied up to Keynes’s concept of Marginal Propensity to Consume 
(MPC – discussed in the first chapter) that measures what the fraction of individual increase 
in income spent on consumption is. In other words, MPC shows what proportion of a person’s 
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additional income will be spent (MPC)
116
.  The higher the MPC, the greater would be the 
multiplier. 
                                          The formula for the multiplier is :        
1
1−MPC
 
The Kahn-Keynes theory of the multiplier can be better explained using a numerical example. 
Assuming that MPC of everybody in the society is 0,8 (80%), the multiplier is a factor of 5 
(1/1-0,8). Let us further assume that government will increase its spending by 1000 on the 
goods produced by person A. In turn, A will spend 800 on goods produced by person B. Thn, 
person B will spend 640 on goods produced by person C, and then C will spend 512 on goods 
produced by person D. This chain will continue repeating itself until exhaustion. In 
conclusion, the total increase in GDP will not be 1000 (the initial amount of money injected in 
to the economy by the government) but 1000 + 800 + 640 + 512+…etc  = 5000. In other 
words, the impact of public expenditures on GDP will be multiplied by the factor of 5.  
 
1.3 INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
 
The monetary and fiscal tools were crucial in Keynesian anti-crises repertoire. He did not 
attach comparable importance to the question of trade unions (in “The General Theory” there 
are only three explicit references to the trade unions), wealth and income distribution. 
However, there are some hints in Keynes’s writings that do indicate that he considered large 
wealth disparities not only as something ethically reprehensible, but also as a potentially 
destabilising factor. 
 
Firstly, Keynes opposed the view that there is moral justification for the inequitable 
distribution of wealth and incomes. Keynes disputed the popular belief (supported by 
orthodox economic theories) about the origins of the profit and economic growth. According 
to this argument, frugal and thrifty individuals postpone their current consumption (they save 
part of their income) in order to invest. Those investments create employment and increase 
overall wealth of the society. Therefore those individuals (entrepreneurs) deserve a reward in 
the form of profits for their sacrifices (delay of their consumption) and their service to 
community.  
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But as it was shown in the first chapter, in Keynes’s theory the causation is inverted, because 
“investment preceded saving, both in causation and in time”117. Since the causal relationship 
goes from investments to savings, Keynes noticed, “(…) our argument leads towards the 
conclusion that in contemporary conditions the growth of wealth, so far from being dependent 
on the abstinence of the rich, as is commonly supposed, is more likely to be impeded by it. 
One of the chief social justifications of great inequality of wealth is, therefore, removed”118. 
 
Secondly, in a passing remark in chapter 8 of “The General Theory” Keynes seems to suggest 
that in fact, the question of distribution of wealth has some importance for his theory of 
effective demand: “If fiscal policy is used as a deliberate instrument for the more equal 
distribution of incomes, its effect in increasing the propensity to consume is, of course, all the 
greater”119. Since the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) of low and moderate income 
individuals is relatively high, some level of wealth/income redistribution could stimulate total 
spending in economy (and therefore would have desirable results from the point of view of 
aggregate demand). Unfortunately, Keynes did not examine the question of wealth/income 
distribution and its consequences for the theory of effective demand in details
 120
. 
 
Thirdly, Keynes recommended designing the government budgets in such a way that they 
would reduce the size of fluctuation of level of output and unemployment in case of recession. 
These could be achieved thanks to so-called Automatic Stabilizers: a type of government 
transfer program like social security payments, unemployment insurance, subsidies and 
progressive income tax.  
 
Contrary to fiscal policies discussed in point 1.2 of chapter 2, those automatic stabilisers are 
non-discretionary, in the sense that “they operate without government deliberation about 
policy, and therefore without any decision-making lag time”121. By increasing social transfers 
(like unemployment benefits) during the economic downturn, government stabilises the level 
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of total spending in the economy and therefore offsets the negative consequences of the 
recession. 
 
For all those reasons, Keynes embraced a moderate distribution of wealth through different 
government welfare programs and progressive taxation. He was not, however, committed to 
ideas of egalitarianism: “For my own part, I believe that there is social and psychological 
justification for significant inequalities of incomes and wealth, but not for such large 
disparities as exist today”122. In Keynes’s views income and wealth disparities were not a 
problem in itself (on the contrary- they were “beneficial”) – only excessive concentration of 
wealth was socially and politically dysfunctional. 
 
1.4 KEYNES’S POLICIES EFFECTIVNESS : AN APPRAISAL 
 
Keynes’s theory provided theoretical justification for increased government interventionism. 
In the United States and Western Europe policy-makers of all political colors (“We are all 
Keynesians now”123)  embraced the idea that demand management by fiscal and monetary 
tools (and to a lesser extent –  some level of wealth distribution) can provide full employment 
and stable growth. Counter cyclical policies, supposedly inspired by Keynes (or, to be more 
precise, by specific interpretation of Keynes’s ideas) marked a period in a socioeconomic 
history of the so-called Western world, from 1940 until the late 1970s. 
 
The effectiveness of Keynes’s policies recommendations is, however, a highly controversial 
topic among economists. The critics focused chiefly on the fiscal component of Keynes’s 
proposals. As I mentioned before, Keynes himself was involved in a heated debate with 
economists representing the so-called Treasury View (like Ralph Hawtrey), according to 
which public spending would “crowd out” private spending. The debate over fiscal stimulus 
revived in the context of adoption of The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(commonly referred to as “Obama economic stimulus package” or “fiscal stimulus”).  
 
To quote one of the most outspoken modern-day proponents of the “Treasury view” and critic 
of fiscal stimulus, John H. Cochrane from Chicago University :  
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 “(…) if money is not going to be printed, it has to come from somewhere. If the 
government borrows a dollar from you, that is a dollar that you do not spend, or 
that you do not lend to a company to spend on new investment. Every dollar of 
increased government spending must correspond to one less dollar of private 
spending. Jobs created by stimulus spending are offset by jobs lost from the 
decline in private spending. We can build roads instead of factories, but fiscal 
stimulus can’t help us to build more of both”124. 
 
According to Cochrane, theoretical arguments in favour of fiscal stimulus are flawed and 
therefore government spending programs will not cure the economic malaise. In fact, they can 
only make matters worse
125
. 
 
Adherents of the rational expectations hypothesis and the Neoclassical school formulated 
another critique. The so-called Ricardo–De Viti–Barro equivalence theorem or simply the 
Ricardian equivalence proposition
126
, states that governments’ efforts to stimulate aggregate 
demand are deemed to fail. It is not important whether extra governmental spending will be 
financed by issuing the debt or increased taxes. According to Barro, since government will 
need to pay for today’s fiscal stimulus by increasing the taxes tomorrow, rational individuals 
will save money to pay for those future taxes. All extra public spending will be cancelled out 
by increased savings of the private sector, and all the governmental actions to attempt to boost 
the aggregate demand will be ineffective. 
 
In spite of those theoretical objections to increased government spending, the overwhelming 
body of evidence has revealed that Keynes-inspired aggregate demand stimulus is in fact very 
effective. The following section of this chapter provides some important historical examples 
of the effectiveness of the expansionary fiscal policies. 
 
The Great Depression of the 1930s had particularly devastating consequences for Japan's 
economy. The economic crises hit Japan in the 1930 and lasted until 1932. Japan experienced  
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severe double-digit deflation and its gross national product declined by 10% in 1930 and 9% 
in 1931
127
. In December 1931, the new Japanese Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (from 
Rikken Seiyūkai’s political party) appointed as a Minister of Finance Takahashi Korekiyo, a 
man that is often referred to as the “Japanese Keynes”128 for his systematic implementation of 
“Keynesian policies” even before the publication of General Theory. 
 
Immediately after taking office, Korekiyo reversed the contractionary policies of the previous 
government (Minsei Party) and implemented the following reforms of the economy: 
 
- abandonment of the gold standard and the fixed exchange rate, and floating of the Yen, 
- monetary expansion and low interest rates, 
- expansionary fiscal policies : deficit spending financed by the sale of bonds by the Bank of 
Japan
129
. 
 
The Japanese government used large government deficit spending to stimulate economy – 
mainly on public infrastructure investment (land reclamation, irrigation, drainage, dykes, 
roads, and river repairs
130
) and on increased military spending. Government increased by 32 
% in 1932 and another 16 % in 1933
131
. Interestingly enough, Korekiyo justified those new 
economic policies in terms of the Keynes-Khan fiscal multiplier and there are some hints that 
he actually had read Keynes pamphlet “Can Lloyd George Do It?”132 
 
Hugh Patrick described the outcome of Korekiyo’s reforms as “one of the most successful 
combination of fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange rate policies, in an adverse 
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international environment, that the world has ever seen
133”. Indeed, Japan was able to avoid 
the worst effects of the Great Depression, and by the late 1932 Japanese economy was 
growing again. Numerous economic historians attribute a crucial role in reversing the Japan 
economic downturn to Korekiyo’s reforms134.  
 
Perhaps the most famous historical example of government spending aimed to stimulate 
aggregate demand was a set of federal programs (“The New Deal”) launched in the 30s by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the response to the Great Depression. Even today, there is 
no consensus on the question of the effectiveness of the New Deal’s fiscal policies and the 
question is still controversial among the economists.  
 
Analysing the attitudes towards Roosevelt’s administration policies as a classification 
criterion, one can distinguish three groups of economists: those who think that the fiscal 
policy was central to recovery (this group includes mostly economists working in the Neo-
Keynesian and Post-Keynesian traditions)
135
; the second group that downgraded the 
importance of government spending and connected the recovery with increased money 
supply
136
; and finally those who think that New Deal policies indeed prolonged the economic 
crisis
137
. 
 
The detailed discussion of different interpretations of the New Deal’s fiscal policies is beyond 
the scope of this work, but data from the US labour market in the 30s and the beginning of the 
40s seem to indicate very strong correlation between government expenditures and decreased 
unemployment.  
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This can be seen in the following table: 
 
YEAR GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES AND 
INVESTMENTS (in 
current dollars) 
RATE  OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
1932 $8.7   billion 24.1% 
1933 $8.7   billion 24.9% 
1934 $10.5  billion 21.7% 
1935 $10.9  billion 20.1% 
1936 $13.1  billion 16.9% 
1937 $12.8  billion 14.3% 
1938 $13.8  billion 19.0% 
1939 $14.8  billion 17.2% 
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition, ed. Susan Carter, Scott Sigmund 
Gartner, Michael Haines, Alan Olmsted, Richard Sutch and Gavin Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) 
 
The data above show that New Deal’s fiscal policies had rather moderate success: the 
unemployment rate decreased effectively by almost 7% but it was still a double-digit on the 
eve of World War 2 (17,2%). In reality, and contrary to commonplace knowledge, 
Roosevelt’s fiscal stimulus was relatively small. Average government spending as percentage 
of GDP amounts to 12% during the Hoover Administration (1929-1932) and 15,4% during 
Roosevelt's New Deal (1933-1939)
138
.  
 
Additionally, the effects of this modest increase in public expenditures were offset by two 
other factors: the policy of balanced budgets of state and local authorities (that cancelled out 
the benefits of the federal spending) and Hoover's tax reform (The Revenue Act of 1932) that 
dramatically raised the tax burden (i.e. the “leakages”), whose effects were felt for the first 
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time in the fiscal year of 1933
139
. Moreover, Roosevelt was constantly flip-flopping on the 
question of deficit spending. He maneuvered between the moderate expansionary fiscal policy 
and budget consolidation (cutting public spending and increasing the taxes), which caused the 
recession of 1937–38.  
 
In reality the injection of the federal spending into American economy was not big enough to 
compensate for the fall of private investments
140
. Given the modest increase in spending, the 
recession gap could not be closed and Roosevelt’s policies could not bring back the economy 
to the full employment level. As E. Cary Brown famously noticed: “fiscal policy… seems to 
have been an unsuccessful recovery device in the thirties – not because it does not work, but 
because it was not tried”141.  
 
With the outbreak of World War 2, the Roosevelt administration was forced to dramatically 
increase the size of the government expenditures: the average government spending as the 
percentage of GDP in 1940-1945 period amounts to 35.3% (during the New Deal years it was 
only 15,4%)
142
. The American economy almost instantaneously got back to the level of full 
employment. The problem of massive unemployment was finally resolved not by moderate 
New Deal policies but by much more radical “Military Keynesianism” of war years. 
 
The more recent examples of the increased government spending include various national 
fiscal stimulus plans aimed at addressing the effects of the global financial crisis (The Great 
Recession of 2008). Given the national particularities of each country and different size and 
composition (tax cuts or direct public investments) of this stimulus, any general evaluation of 
their effectiveness should be made with caution.  
 
However, we can affirm that their general outcome for the global economy was positive. The 
Report of the International Labour Organization (ILO) states that: “The current recovery of 
the global economy owes much to the active use of fiscal stimulus measures against the global 
crisis”143. The authors of this report surveyed accessible studies about the effectiveness of the 
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national fiscal stimulus and reached the conclusion that the vast majority of published 
research claims that fiscal stimulus programs were in general effective in reducing the 
unemployment and bringing back the growth of the economy (on 25 surveyed studies only 3 
evaluate the results of the stimulus as “negative”)144. The ILO study showed as well that 
countries that adopted bigger stimulus (as a percentage of GDP) “showed relatively better 
GDP and employment”145 recovery. For instance, the particularly successful Chinese stimulus 
was as big as 12.7 percent of China 2008 GDP, whereas advanced economies spent only 3.4 
percent of their 2008 GDP on stimulus
146
. 
 
One of the lingering myths about Keynes is that he was a “depression economist”, in the sense 
that his policy recommendation could be applied only during the economic downturn. In 
reality, Keynes had in mind a more comprehensive reform of the capitalist system, and getting 
the economy out of the slump thanks to monetary and fiscal policy tools was just the first 
step. Keynes put it this way: “The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in 
abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps 
and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom”147.  
 
By keeping the economy in the “permanent quasi-boom” he meant flatting out the business 
cycle. On the level of the nation states, this could be achieved by demand management 
policies like progressive taxation, public expenditures, collective bargaining and income 
policies. To prevent the slumps on the international level, Keynes proposed the creation of the 
supranational institutions that would manage the monetary and exchange rates. Keynes was 
one of the architects of the so-called Bretton Woods Agreement (signed in 1944) that laid the 
foundations of the post-war financial system. The major aim of the Bretton Woods agreement 
was to regulate the international monetary system by establishing institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund (responsible for balance of payment adjustments of member 
countries) and the World Bank (responsible for poverty reduction and development 
assistance). 
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This period of effective functioning of the Bretton Woods institution (1951 – 1973) is 
sometimes referred to as a “Golden Age of Capitalism” or “post–World War II economic 
expansion”, and is characterised by politico-economic stability, high rate of growth and low 
unemployment levels. The 1973´s oil crisis is considered as a symbolic end of the Bretton 
Wood system, when Keynesian-managed capitalism was replaced by more laissez-faire 
approach to economy (“Washington Consensus”).  A more detailed account of this evolution 
will be given in the section 2 of this chapter. Here I would only like emphasise the superiority 
of the Keynesian policies adopted after the second World War over the free market policies 
inspired by “Washington Consensus”. The available evidence seems to suggest that Bretton 
Woods era outperformed the Washington Consensus era in almost every aspect, excepct for 
the inflation rate that was slightly higher during the Bretton Woods era
148
. 
 
1.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Keynes not only correctly identified the cause of the economic malaise (insufficient aggregate 
demand), but also proposed a set of economic policies that would get the economy back to 
full employment levels. The traditional tool box of Keynesian economics includes : moderate 
income distribution (welfare program and automatic stabilisers), permanent low interest rates 
and the fiscal stimulus (tax cuts and direct government spending) aimed to offset lack of 
sufficient private investments. 
 
The historical examples of application of the Keynesian policies discussed in this section 
showed their effectiveness. Takahashi Korekiyo’s fiscal stimulus preserved Japanese 
economy from the worst consequences of the Great Depression, while Roosevelt’s New Deal 
policies alleviated the problem of massive unemployment in the 30s , and military 
expenditures in the beginning of the 40s brought back the economy to full employment. In 
more recent years, the fiscal packages adopted by major countries after 2008 financial crises, 
proved their efficiency in reducing unemployment and enabling the economic growth. 
 
In the next sections of this chapter we will turn to the question of why, in spite of apparent 
success of Keynesian policies, most governments abandoned their commitment to achieving 
and maintaining full employment. 
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2.  KALECKI’S VIEW ON FULL EMPLOYMENT 
 
Keynes’s counter-cyclical fiscal policies proved themselves efficient in keeping the low rates 
of unemployment (close to the full employment level in most of the OECD countries
149
) and 
in maintaining the macroeconomic stabilisation
150
. In spite of their relative success, 
Keynesian macroeconomic policy tools were abandoned in the 70s in favour of more free 
market policies. 
 
The displacement of Keynesian theory in academia, and reduction of its influence in decision-
making circles coincided with the collapse of the Bretton Wood’s system and the end of the 
“Golden Age” of capitalism. The long, post-war economic expansion that has its equivalents 
in every industrialised country (“Italian economic miracle”, “Japanese post-war economic 
miracle”, “Wirtschaftswunder” in Germany, “Trente Glorieuses” in France, etc..) ended 
abruptly in the mid 70s
151
. 
 
There are many theories explaining why this 30-year-long period of unprecedented economic 
prosperity came to such a sudden end. In reality, the replacement of managed (Keynesian) 
capitalism by more laissez-faire oriented capitalism was a complex process to which 
contributed more than one factor, and it would be difficult to attribute a decisive role to one of 
them.  
 
The most standard explanations of the end of the post war boom come from a mainstream 
economist (from the New classical and Chicago School of Economics). They argue that the 
crises of 1970 proved that Neo-Keynesian economics policies led to high levels of inflation 
and stagnant economic growth (stagflation). This theory is often associated with critique of 
the overprotective welfare state (“nanny state”) by the conservative politicians. According to 
them welfare programs generated an insupportable financial burden for the society. 
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Accumulated public debt and overgrown public institutions suppressed the private (i.e. 
“productive”) sector and, in consequence, lead to crises. 
 
An alternative interpretation of the 1970s crises was provided by heterodox economists. As it 
was mentioned before (chapter 1 section 3.1), many post-Keynesian
152
 economists argue that 
the dubious interpretation of Keynes’s thought by Hicks and Samuelson (so-called Neo-
Keynesianism or Neoclassical Synthesis) made it vulnerable for theoretical attacks from 
conservative economists. As a result, not only Samuelson’s interpretation of Keynes was 
rejected, but all Keynesian traditions all together. This had serious practical implications 
since, according to Nicholas Kaldor, the phenomena of stagflation could be easily understood 
and dealt with in the post-Keynesian theoretical framework
153
.  
 
Some Marxist economists
154
 advanced  the “full employment profits squeeze” theory of crisis, 
according to which economic crises in the 70s derived from increased labour militancy and 
resulting falling profit share. Strong trade unions shifted the configuration of power in the 
society on the behalf of working class. The result was a decline (“squeeze”) in capitalist 
profitability and economic stagnation. 
 
In the following section, I will examine a lesser-known explanation of the fundamental 
change in the economic system that we have witnessed in the mid 70s. Michał Kalecki 
already in 1943 claimed that the full employment delivered by the Keynesian policy is 
impossible to sustain under the capitalist mode of production. In his article entitled "Political 
Aspects of Full Employment" Kalecki developed his theory of a political business cycle whose 
main assertion can be broadly resumed as follows: the barriers to full employment are 
political, not economical. 
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Before analysing Kalecki’s concept of the political business cycle in details, I will briefly 
discuss his intellectual background and his theoretical contributions to the theory of effective 
demand. 
 
2.1 KALECKI’S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF 
EFFECTIVE DEMAND 
 
Michał Kalecki was a Polish economist who not only anticipated Keynes “General Theory” 
but also, in some aspects, surpassed the Keynesian approach to the theory of effective 
demand. In 1933, Kalecki published his famous article entitled “An Essay on the Theory of the 
Business Cycle” where he lay out his theory of business cycle that included all the important 
theoretical  ingredients of the later “Keynesian revolution”.  
 
In particular, Kalecki stated that investments determine the total level of output in the 
economy, analysed the determinants of the investments and consequence of their fluctuations 
on the effective demand. Kalecki’s priority in developing the theory of effective demand is 
today undeniable
155. Unfortunately, “Kalecki was not born at the right time, did not live in the 
right place and did not write in the right language”156. 
 
Kalecki developed his version of the theory of effective demand starting from radically 
different theoretical framework than the author of “The General Theory”. Keynes obtained his 
education in Cambridge  and was raised in the neo (classical) economical tradition of Alfred 
Marshall, against which he rebelled later on. Kalecki, on the other hand, was a self-taught 
economist who drew his inspiration from Marx via writings of Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky 
and Rosa Luxemburg. 
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Kalecki was particularly strongly influenced by Marx’s reproduction schema from volume II 
of “Das Capital”, which he used to derive his famous profit equation. For Kalecki capitalist 
profits (P) are equal to capitalist consumption (CP) and capitalist investments (I):  
 
P = CP + I 
 
Kalecki then noticed that  : (…)it is clear that capitalists may decide to consume and to invest 
more in a given period than in the preceding one, but they cannot decide to earn more. It is, 
therefore, their investment and consumption decisions which determine profits, and not vice 
versa”157. This means that the causation runs from investment and capitalist consumption to 
profit (not the other way around), and therefore “fluctuations in production and profits depend 
on the fluctuations in capitalists' consumption and investment”158. 
 
We saw that even though our authors started from different intellectual points of departure, 
(neo) classical in Keynes case and Marxian in Kalecki’s, they arrived to similar conclusions 
about business cycles in the market economy, driven, according to them, mainly by 
investment demand. The fundamental differences between those thinkers concern their 
approach to the social classes: while in Keynes’s theory the question of class struggle is 
absent, it plays an important role in Kalecki’s theoretical framework. 
 
2.2 KALECKI ON POLITICAL ASPECTS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT 
 
In spite of their different intellectual formations, the analytical tools and methodology, 
Kalecki’s and Keynes’s theory of business cycles are very similar. However, contrary to 
Keynes, Kalecki did not limit himself to the analysis of the purely economic aspects of 
fluctuations in the capitalist economy. By introducing some political consideration in his 
famous 1943 essay (“Political Aspects of Full Employment”) he developed his theory of the 
political business cycle (as opposed to business cycle, pure and simple). 
 
The essence of Kalecki’s argument is simple: there are no technical obstacles to reaching full 
employment in capitalist economy. This can be achieved by government spending programs 
(provided that those expenditures are financed by borrowing and not taxes), like public 
                                                          
157
 Kalecki M. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy, 1933–1970 (1971), p. 78-79. 
158
 Kalecki M. Studies in the Theory of Business Cycles, 1933–1939 (1966), p.46 
   66 
 
 
 
investments, reduction of indirect taxation, subsidisation of mass consumption, etc…159 
However, Kalecki argues, political factors would prevent capitalist government from pursuing 
the policy of full employment: “there is a political background in the opposition to the full 
employment doctrine, even though the arguments advanced are economic”.160 
 
Kalecki claimed that every government committed to maintaining full employment would 
face social and political opposition of industrial leaders. This is somehow surprising given 
that maintaining full employment via countercyclical government spending would be 
beneficial not only for workers but also for capitalists (increased employment means 
increased profits). Why then, Kalecki asked, “entrepreneurs do not gladly accept the 
synthetic boom which the government is able to offer them?”161.  
 
Firstly, the opposition of business leaders towards full employment is due to the “dislike of 
government interference in the problem of employment as such”162. Both Kalecki and Keynes 
recognised that private investment is the most volatile component of the aggregate demand. 
At this point, however, the superiority of Kalecki’s analysis over Keynes’s is clear: thanks to 
his class approach to economy,  Kalecki was able to draw the conclusions that are absent in 
Keynes’s theory.  
 
Kalecki argues that control over the investments decisions grants business community (i.e 
capitalists) a considerable power: eventually the level of output and employment in the 
economy depends solely on their discretionary investment decisions. Kalecki claims that 
capitalists are aware of this situation and will not hesitate to benefit from it in order to obtain 
concessions from government: “This gives the capitalists a powerful indirect control over 
government policy: everything which may shake the state of confidence must be carefully 
avoided because it would cause an economic crisis”163. 
 
If, however, government would take over from the private sector responsibility for keeping 
the aggregate demand on full employment (by “socialising investments” to use Keynes’s 
terminology), capitalists would lose this powerful disciplinary device. This is why, according 
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to Kalecki, “captains of industry” will oppose deficit spending directed at increasing the 
employment : “The social function of the doctrine of 'sound finance' is to make the level of 
employment dependent on the state of confidence”164. 
 
The second reason for the political opposition against the full employment, according to 
Kalecki, concerns the direction of the government spending. This argument can be divided in 
two components:  
 
 Opposition towards public investments - public investments will be tolerated by the 
“industrial leaders” only if they do not limit the profitable prospects for the private 
sector (this would be the case of public investments in hospitals, schools, highways, 
etc.). Since the scope of such investments is rather limited, they are afraid that, sooner 
or later, public investments will “crowd out” the private ones.  
  Opposition towards public social transfers - “business leaders and their experts” will 
also oppose subsidies to mass consumption (like family allowances, subsidies to keep 
down the prices of necessities), even if they are not limiting the investments 
opportunities for the private sector. Here hostility of business community is caused not 
because their profits are in danger, but for ideological reasons: “For here a moral 
principle of the highest importance is at stake.  The fundamentals of capitalist ethics 
require that 'you shall earn your bread in sweat' -- unless you happen to have private 
means”165.  
 
Thirdly, Kalecki claims that even if the government (backed by organised labour) overcame 
this opposition and achieved the full employment, business community would oppose the 
maintenance of this state of affairs in the long term. “The social and political changes 
resulting from the maintenance of full employment”, would change the balance of power 
between capitalist and worker class in the favour of the latter. Full employment capitalism 
(contrary to laissez-faire capitalism) would erode the social position of the “captains of 
industry”, since they would lose the powerful disciplinary device over workers – fear of 
unemployment. Without this fear, workers and their trade unions would be in a more 
advantageous position to demand higher wages and better working conditions. 
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2.3 JOAN ROBINSON’S CONTRIBUTION 
 
Joan Robinson was one of Keynes’s closest collaborators, a pioneer of the Post-Keynesian 
school of thought and a major participant of the Cambridge Capital Debates. She befriended 
Michał Kalecki during his stay in the Cambridge University in the 1930s and since then 
Kalecki had significant intellectual impact on Robinson’s thought166. Kalecki’s influence on 
Robinson’s thought was particularly evident in her famous “An Essay on Marxian 
Economics”167, which was an attempt to “put class analysis, imperialism, and military 
expenditure into the General Theory”168. 
 
Joan Robinson shared Kalecki’s skepticism about the ability of achieving full employment by 
laissez -faire capitalism. Just as Kalecki, Robinson argued that the unemployment is possible 
to eradicate via “public expenditure and public control on a sufficient scale”, but due to the 
political opposition of the business community, governments will not be able to pursue the 
policy of full employment. In this short section I will briefly discuss her arguments put 
forward in her two open letters to “The Time” from 1943 and her brochure “The Problem of 
Full Employment”.169  
 
Robinson argues that unemployment is not an extrinsic feature of capitalism, but is in fact 
functional to it. Maintaining full employment in the long term would necessarily transform 
some social arrangements of “private enterprise economy”. Consequently, governments 
committed to full employment policies will face political opposition of groups whose position 
would be undermined by lasting full employment. 
 
According to Robinson, the first function of unemployment is to maintain the authority of 
employer over their employees: “The master has normally been in a position to say: ‘If you 
don’t want the job, there are plenty of others who do.’ When the man can say: ‘If you don’t 
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want to employ me, there are plenty of others who will,” the situation is radically altered.” 
Eradication of the fear of unemployment would reinforce the bargaining position of the 
workers, weaken the factory discipline and erode the privileged economical position of the 
capitalist class. 
 
The second function of unemployment in capitalism is to preserve the value of money. Full 
employment economy would enable the organised labour to make excessive wage demands 
and, in consequence, to initiate a vicious circle of demand-pull inflation. As a side notice 
Robinson observes that totalitarian regimes (fascist and communist) do not face the problem 
of inflation in spite of maintaining full employment (thanks to violent repression of the trade 
unions, propaganda appeal and wages regulated by the state).  
 
However, Robinson claimed that full employment and low inflation are achievable also in the 
framework of parliamentary democracy. This would require some substantial reforms of 
capitalist system like for example extension of competence of work councils, national level 
wage agreement and full publicity of cost of production (in order to avoid cost push inflation). 
2.4  THE KALECKI-ROBINSON POLITICAL BUISNESS CYCLE 
 
Kalecki and Robinson’s theory of the political business cycle offers a credible explanation of 
the collapse of the so-called Golden Age of capitalism. This can be summarised as follows : in 
a parliamentary democracy high levels of unemployment are electorally unpopular and every 
politician running for re-election will take this factor into consideration. Thus, governments 
will use both monetary and fiscal macroeconomic tools to achieve, or at least get close to full 
employment.   
 
However, for the reasons mentioned by Kalecki (and Robinson) this situation will be 
impossible to sustain in the long term: “a powerful bloc . . . between big business and the 
rentiers’ interests, and they would probably find more than one economist to declare that the 
situation was manifestly unsound. The pressure of all these forces, and in particular of big 
business, would most probably induce the Government to return to the orthodox policy of 
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cutting down the budget deficit”170. Balancing the budget would, in turn, increase 
unemployment and so the political business cycle would go back to the point of departure. 
 
The fact that government committed to full employment will necessarily face the political 
opposition of business community was acknowledged as well by another prominent Post-
Keynesian economist - Nicholas Kaldor. In a way similar to Kalecki’s, he argued that “The 
reason of this antagonism (to Keynesian ideas), not openly acknowledged, was the change in 
the power structure of society which the pursuit of Keynesian policies has brought about.”171 
The political objection towards full employment identified by Kalecki and Robinson played a 
major role in gradual erosion of the post-war socio-economic consensus in Europe and the 
US.  
 
We recall that Kalecki’s first argument concerned “the powerful indirect control over 
government policy” that capitalist class would lose in case of eradication of unemployment. 
Long-term full employment would ensure the governments more room for manoeuvring in 
their internal politics - particularly in fiscal policies and welfare programs. They simply 
would not be limited by the necessity of maintaining the so-called state of confidence of 
business community. Major advance in transportation and telecommunication infrastructure 
that we have witnessed since the mid-70s dramatically changed the relation of power between 
nation states and “captains of industry”. The capitalist class of a given country not satisfied 
with governmental policy (for instance, with tax reform) can simply choose not to invest (a 
sort of “investment strike”) in a given country and move the production to another country – 
more concerned with keeping the high levels of the “state of confidence” of the business 
community. 
 
Secondly, Kalecki claimed that capitalists would oppose the direction of government 
spending : public investment and subsidising consumption. Here Kalecki seems to anticipate 
the ideological offensive against the welfare state and public services that was particularly 
acute in the 70s and 80s. In this rhetoric, the private sector is more efficient and dynamic than 
the sluggish and costly public sector. Precisely as Kalecki foresees, “captains of industry and 
their experts” were opposing the welfare state on the ethical grounds, because “the 
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fundamentals of capitalist ethics require that 'you shall earn your bread in sweat' -- unless 
you happen to have private means”. 
 
Thirdly, elimination of the fear of unemployment would deprive the capitalists of disciplinary 
tools over workers. In the full employment economy, the power relation between capitalists 
and workers would change to the benefit of the latter and, consequently, give workers a better 
bargaining position. Higher wages would not only decrease the capitalist profits but (and this 
is the point made by Robinson) would also cause the inflationary pressures and undermine the 
“value of money”.   
 
The end of the 1970s marked a radical shift in public approach to labour markets: the goal of 
providing the work for everybody was replaced by the commitment to keeping the price 
stability. The responsibility for finding employment was transferred from society to 
individuals (as well as blame – in case of not finding one). The role of fiscal policy was 
downgraded and priority was given to monetary policy conducted by independent (i.e. out of 
democratic control) central banks. Their only role is to keep the low inflation by manipulating 
the interest rates and controlling the money supply.  
 
In this new institutional environment with changed public priorities, “unemployment is part of 
the essential mechanism of the system, and has a definite function to fulfill
172
. This role 
consists of preventing the organised labour from making excessive wage demands. Indeed, 
after 1980 most governments of developed countries seem to accept higher levels of 
unemployment in exchange for greater price stability (see table in section 1.4). 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The object of this chapter was twofold. Firstly, to provide a comprehensive examination of 
John Maynard Keynes’s economic policy recommendations. Secondly, to discuss the 
relevance of Kalecki’s theory of political business cycle for explanation of abandonment of 
the full employment commitment by most of the developed countries in the mid 70s. 
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Economic policies inspired by Keynes’s theory were largely adopted by most of the 
developed countries in the 30s and 40s, and to a great extent contributed to post–World War II 
economic expansion. Those “Keynesian policies” included policies of permanent low interest 
rates, of fiscal stimulus (tax cuts and government investments) and, to some degree, of income 
distribution via welfare programs and so-called automatic stabilisers. 
 
Examples of aggregate demand stimulus by government spending analysed in this chapter 
provided strong evidence of its effectiveness. Governments that adopted Keynesian policies 
were able not only to boost the economic growth and bring back full employment, but also to 
flatten out extremes in fluctuations of the trade cycle. This resulted in the unprecedented 
period of economic growth (so-called Golden Age of capitalism) that lasted from 1945 to the 
mid 1970s and was characterised by wage growth, welfare state expansion and low 
unemployment rates. 
 
Michał Kalecki and Joan Robinson claimed that this policy of full employment will be 
impossible to sustain in the long term. Nevertheless, the reasons for that were political, not 
economic. Kalecki argued that achieving full employment is technically possible (via 
government spending), but it will not be sustainable for political reasons. According to 
Kalecki and Robinson, unemployment is functional to the laissez-faire form of capitalism. It 
is a powerful disciplinary device used by “captains of the industry” to control workerss wages 
demands,  to keep the price stability and to influence the policies conducted by the 
governments. For Kalecki, elimination of the “fear of unemployment” would undermine the 
social and political position of the capitalist class, and therefore they will oppose the full 
employment policies. 
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CHAPTER 3: PERSPECTIVES OF FULL EMPLOYMENT 
 
In the precedent chapter we saw that starting from the mid-1970s most governments of the 
developed countries abandoned the commitment to achieve and maintain full employment 
through aggregate demand management. The main goal of the governmental macroeconomic 
policies became price stability (i.e. low inflation) and the responsibility for employment was 
transferred to the private sector. Indeed, just as Joan Robinson argued, the principal argument 
against the policy of full employment today is willingness to preserve the value of money. 
Mainstream economic theories (the concept of NAIRU) argue that, in order to eliminate the 
inflation, society needs to accept some levels of unemployment, because full employment 
would necessarily create an inflationary pressure (demand pull inflation). 
 
In this chapter I will discuss an interesting recent advancement in economic theory - a 
development of a new macroeconomic school of thought which claims that sustainment of 
both full employment and price stability are not mutually exclusive goals. The fundamental 
message of the so-called Modern Monetary Theory (MMT)
173
 can be resumed as follows: 
“monetarily sovereign governments are always solvent, and can afford to buy anything for 
sale in their domestic unit of account even though they may face inflationary and political 
constraints”174. Because sovereign government does not have any affordability constraints 
they enjoy extremely large domestic policy space and, therefore, they can focus both on 
keeping stable prices and eradicating unemployment. 
 
This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section I will present the “intellectual 
family tree” of the MMT. In the second section I will discuss the MMT approach to 
macroeconomics, with special focus on the nature and role played by “fiat money” in 
contemporary economy. In the last section I will examine the MMT proposition concerning 
full employment policies: the proposition of the job guarantee (JG) known also as employer 
of last resort (ELS). 
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1. HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE MMT 
 
The Modern Money Theory is a relatively new school of economic thought that originated in 
the early 1990s, but its intellectual lineage can be tracked down to the beginning of the 20th 
century. Indeed, MMT can be perceived as a creative synthesis of various intellectual 
traditions that already existed, rather than a completely new theory. In this first section I will 
briefly discuss some of those early theoretical contributions to MMT, namely the works of G. 
Frederick Knapp, Mitchell Innes, Abba Lerner’s, and the theory of endogenous money. 
Hyman Minsky’s concept of the employer of last resort (ELR) will be developed in the third 
section. 
 
1.1 GEORGE FREDERICK KNAPP AND THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY (CHARTALISM). 
 
The ideas that constitute the foundations of the Modern Money Theory can be traced back to 
the German economist Georg Friedrich Knapp (1842 –1926). Knapp in his book “The State 
Theory of Money”  (1905) developed the term “Chartal money” from the Latin word Charta, 
which means a ticket or token. He established his theory of monetary system in opposition to 
the “metalistic” view, according to which the value of money comes from precious metals of 
which it is made (like gold or silver) or because it can be redeemed on such metal.  
 
Knapp’s theory provides an alternative explanation of the origins of money. In the 
mainstream (“metalist”) approach, emergence of the commodity money was a product of the 
spontaneous evolution of market exchange. To put it simply, market participants, in order to 
overcome the inconveniences of the market exchange, chose one commodity that can serve as 
common denominator (numéraire). Relative prices of all other commodities are expressed in 
terms of this one commodity, agreed upon by all other market participants.  
 
According to Knapp, however, money did not evolve spontaneously, but was designed and 
created by the state. He points out that “The money of a State is…what is accepted at public 
pay office”175. In other words, state can arbitrary choose a unit of account in which citizens’ 
debts towards that state (like taxes, fines, etc…) will be denominated. State is also free to 
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choose any type of material that will function as a “money thing” denominated in that unit of 
account – “the standard is not chosen for any properties of the metals”176 
 
To strengthen his argument, Knapp examines the situation of debts during the transition of 
one metal to another metal as a means of payment. For metalists, the unit of value gains its 
name in terms of the material. Then, according to them, when the state changes the means of 
payment, the absolute amount of debts should remain unchanged. However, Knapp argues 
that the historical experience shows differently. When the state declares a new means of 
payment, the state determines at the same time what other new material and how much of it 
would represent the unit of the means of payment. By doing so, the state maintains only the 
relative amount of the existing debts. In fact, “the state treats the existing debts as the unit of 
value,…, treats as the nominal debts”177. The means of payment is changed by the state. In 
that case, debts as units of value are paid with the new means of payment. Hence, “all debts 
are converted to the new metal, which proves that all units of account must be nominal” 178. 
 
We can highlight three key points in Knapp’s theory on the modern monetary system. First, as 
his examination of debts shows, the unit of payment is always historical. The validity of one 
currency does not derive from its material content. The unit of value is defined historically. It 
is altered and denominated by the state. Its relation to the former unit is also defined by the 
state. So as Knapp famously states in the beginning of his book:  “MONEY is a creature of 
law. A theory of money must therefore deal with legal history” .179 
 
Secondly, when the state introduces a new means of payment, the state defines this new 
means of payment by its relation to the former unit of payment. So this transition from one 
metal to another necessitates the state to declare a conversion rate between these two metals. 
That is to say that debts are not metallic, but nominal. Knapp concludes that “The nominality 
of debts and of the unit of value is a necessary premise before money can come into being. So 
Money is a means of payment, but not necessarily a material one”180. 
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Thirdly, Knapp points out the important role of the state in this process. In fact, his historical 
argument is based on the examination of the state’s activity. The state can alter the means of 
payment. The validity of the new unit as money is determined by the proclamation of the 
state. The state declares that the new currency will be accepted at public pay offices. Thus 
“nominality of the unit of value is created by the State, in its capacity as the guardian and 
maintainer of law.”181 
 
The validity of a currency, irrespective of its material content, is based on the proclamation of 
the state. Money is related to the law, which regulates its use. Consequently Knapp 
encapsulates his theory as follows: “Money always signifies a Chartal means of payment. 
Every Chartal means of payment we call money. The definition of money is therefore ‘a 
Chartal means of payment”182. 
 
1.2 ALFRED MITCHELL INNES AND THE CREDIT THEORY OF MONEY. 
 
Alfred Mitchell Innes (1864 – 1950) was a British diplomat and self-thought economist whose 
research was focused mainly on the nature of credit and money in modern economy. He wrote 
only two articles on economic theory
183
 : “What is Money?” and “Credit Theory of Money” 
both published in The Banking Law Journal
184
. 
 
Innes, just like Knapp, opposed the conventional monetary theory, according to which money 
derives its value through a link to precious metal, like gold or silver. Innes argued that this 
“metalist” approach is erroneous and that in reality money is just a form of credit. The nature 
of money is explained by what Innes called “credit theory of money”:  “(…) a sale and 
purchase is the exchange of a commodity for a credit. From this main theory springs the sub-
theory that the value of credit or money does not depend on the value of any metal or metals, 
but on the right which the creditor acquires to ‘payment,’ that is to say, to satisfaction for the 
credit, and on the obligation of the debtor to ‘pay’ his debt, and conversely on the right of the 
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debtor to release himself from his debt by the tender of an equivalent debt owed by the 
creditor, and the obligation of the creditor to accept this tender in satisfaction of his 
credit.”185. The words “debt” and “credit” describe the same legal relationship considered 
from two different point of views : debtor’s and creditor’s’.  
 
According to Innes, and contrary to the traditional approach, money was not created in order 
to facilitate the barter exchange of goods. The major weakness of the “barter theory” of 
money is its unrealistic assumption of the double coincidence of wants of both parties of the 
hypothetical market exchange
186
.  Providing historical and archeological data, Innes argue that 
chronologically institution of credit preceded the apparition of what is sometimes referred to 
as commodity money. Operation of selling does not consist of exchange of some good or 
service for intermediate commodity called ‘medium of exchange’, but is rather an “exchange 
of a commodity for a credit”187. 
 
Money, even backed by precious metals like gold, has not any intrinsic value. It is just a 
device that serves to record the credit transaction: “A priceless gem or a worthless bit of paper 
may equally be a token of debt, so long as the receiver knows what it stands for and the giver 
acknowledges his obligation to take it back in payment of a debt due”188. Money then is a 
recognition of a debt, a promise to pay by the debtor. Every object can play this role, as long 
as both the debtor and the creditor agreed upon the form: it can be a promissory note, shells, 
gold, silver, tally sticks or the government money. 
 
Innes claims, however, that government money (it does not matter if its backed by gold or 
not) has a special status, that makes it quite different from other kinds of “money”. It is due to 
confidence that community has credit in the government and the fact that state money is 
accepted by governments as a means of obligation discharge that citizens have towards the 
state: the tax payment. Tax obligation ensures that every citizen will desire some amount of 
governmental money. In other words, there will always be some demand for it because 
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obtaining the governmental money is the only possible way for the citizens to cancel the debt 
that they have towards the state. 
 
1.3 POST-KEYNESIANS AND THE ENDOGENOUS MONEY THEORY 
 
The origins of the endogenous money theory can be linked with the 19th century British 
Banking School and to economists such as Knut Wicksell and Joseph Schumpeter
189
. In its 
modern form the endogenous approach was developed by economists associated with the 
Post-Keynesian school, especially : Richard Kahn, Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor
190
. A 
detailed presentation of the endogenous theory of money is beyond the scope of this work so 
in the following presentation I will focus only on the essential points. 
 
According to the mainstream economic theories money supply is created exogenously, i.e. 
only through the initiative of the central bank (exogenously to financial market pressures). In 
this approach central bank has direct control over the supply of money. Post-Keynesian 
economists claim that this vision of money is not correct because the so-called monetary base 
or high-powered money (which includes coins, notes and commercial banks' reserves that are 
maintained in their accounts in central bank) constitutes only a small portion of money in 
circulation. 
 
Most money in contemporary capitalist economies is created by private banks and financial 
institutions in response to the demand from the private sector. The loans create deposits, not 
the other way around. Every time when a new deposit account is created by the bank or a 
credit is given by the financial institution, new money is created (“credit money” or “debt 
money”)191. In other words, the fluctuations of the money supply are correlated with the 
private sector’s demand for it. Money supply is endogenous in the sense that incentives to 
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create new money come from within the private sector, and not from the monetary authority 
(the central bank)
192
. 
1.4 ABBA LERNER AND FUNCTIONAL FINANCE 
 
Abba Lerner (1903 – 1982) was a prominent participant of the so-called Socialist Calculation 
Debate in which (together with other "neoclassical socialists", like Oskar Lange) he opposed 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek over the feasibility of the centrally planned economy.   
His most important contribution to the economic theory is his concept of “functional finance” 
developed for the first time in his article "Functional Finance and the Federal Debt”193. 
 
Lerner rejected the concept of the so-called Sound Finance - that is the idea that the 
government income should always balance its expenditures. Government policies should 
always be judged from the point of view of their effectiveness in achieving the 
macroeconomic goals. The fact that those policies would be deficit-financed was, according 
to Lerner, secondary. 
 
Lerner himself described the essence of the functional finance approach, as follows: “The 
central idea is that government fiscal policy, its spending and taxing, its borrowing and 
repayment of loans, its issue of new money and its withdrawal of money, shall all be 
undertaken with an eye only to the results of these actions on the economy and not to any 
established traditional doctrine about what is sound and what is unsound. This principle of 
judging only by effects has been applied in many other fields of human activity, where it is 
known as the method of science opposed to scholasticism. The principle of judging fiscal 
measures by the way they work or function in the economy we may call Functional 
Finance”194. 
 
According to Lerner, and contrary to advocates of the doctrine of the “sound finance”,  budget 
deficits are not inherently bad (nor good). They are totally justified if they help to achieve 
macroeconomic goals defined by the community, such as: full employment, low inflation, 
economic growth, prosperity, etc… Conversely, governments’ actions (like borrowing, 
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lending, taxing, spending, buying, or selling) that hinder those goals, would not be consistent 
with the principle of functional finance (i.e. they would be dysfunctional). 
 
For Randall Wray, one of the most eminent advocates of the MMT, the functional finance 
approach to policy could be summed up in two following principles
195
 : 
 
1. If domestic income is too low, governments need to spend more (relative to taxes). 
Existence of unemployed labour force is a clear evidence that economy suffers from 
insufficient demand and, therefore, governments should start spending (and/or lower the 
taxes). 
 
2. If the domestic interest rates are too high, it means that the government should lower them 
by y increasing the money supply (in form of the bank reserves). 
 
In the second section I will elaborate what, according to Lerner and proponents of the MMT, 
the functional finance approach to government economic policy would look like in practice.  
 
I will conclude this section with a diagram showing various subgroups in Post– Keynesian 
economics and a place of the MMT in the so-called “broad tent” Post-Keynesianism: 
 
Source: Blog Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Post Keynesian PerspectiveTHE: Post Keynesian 
Economics: A Revised Diagram (posted on Tuesday, April 15, 2014) 
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 L. Randall Wray (2012): Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary 
Systems, Palgrave Macmillan 2013, p. 193-194.  
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2. MAIN CONCEPTS OF THE MODERN MONEY THEORY 
 
The theoretical components presented in the first section were integrated into the new 
macroeconomic theory, called Modern Money Theory (MMT) that goes well beyond the 
original concepts of Knapp, Mitchell-Innes, Lerner, and proponents of the endogenous money 
theory. Today MMT can be classified as an independent macroeconomic theory or as a part of 
the “broad tent” of Post Keynesianism196.  
 
The most important advocates of the MMT today are the following: Randall Wray, William 
"Bill" Mitchell, Pavlina Tcherneva, Mat Forstater, Warren Mosler and Scott Fullwiler. MMT 
is associated with the work of the economic department of the University of Missouri in 
Kansas City and private think tanks, like the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, 
the Jerome Levy Economics Institute and the Centre of Full Employment and Equity. 
 
The main goal of the Modern Money Theory is to explain how currency issued by monetarily 
sovereign governments functions in contemporary economies. In the following section I will 
present the main theoretical buildings blocks of the MMT. 
 
2.1  MACRO ACCOUNTING 
 
The economists from MMT are working in the sectoral balances (also known as sectoral 
financial balances) analytical framework, developed by a British economist Wynne Godley
197
. 
The national economy in this approach is divided into three main financial sectors: 
government, the foreign financial sector and the private financial sector. The differences in 
expenditures and incomes among those sectors are called “financial balances”. 
 
The sectoral balances framework is linked to another theoretical contribution of Godley -  the 
concept of Stock-Flow Consistency (SFC). The notions of “stocks” and “flows” are often 
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 For instance Mark Hayes (Secretary of the Post Keynesian Economics Study Group) consider MMT as a 
branch of Post Keynesian economics. Lecture of  Mark Hayes, “The Post Keynesian (Policy) Difference” 2010 
available online:  http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/mgh37/HayesMcCombie191010.mp3 
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 Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie, 2007. Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, 
Income, Production and Wealth, Palgrave MacMillan. 
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confused, but the distinction between them is central for the SFC approach to economics”198. 
A “stock” refers to a quantity that is measurable at a particular point of time (for instance, the 
1st of January of 2013), and therefore includes also quantities that were accumulated in the 
previous periods. A “flow” refers to a quantity that is measured with reference to a period of 
time (length of time), like an hour, a day or a year. Budget deficit would be an example of a 
flow (difference between government’s income and expenditure per fiscal year) while public 
debt would be an example of a stock (accumulated budget deficits). The main idea behind the 
Stock-Flow Consistency (SFC) approach is that in a closed economy, every net increase in 
one stock must be equal to a net decrease in another stock (and equal to the net flow into it). 
 
By applying Godley’s concepts of Stock-Flow Consistency (SFC) and sectoral balances, 
Randall Wray listed the following basic principles that apply to macroeconomic accounting 
199
: 
 
1. One’s financial asset is another’s financial liability – Financial assets and financial 
liabilities are two sides of the same coin and for the economy considered as a whole they 
offset each other. For instance, a governmental bond is an asset for a buyer (household or 
private financial institution) but a liability for its issuer (the government). In the same manner 
the demand deposit is an asset for household and a liability for a bank. 
 
This rule does not apply to real assets (nonfinancial wealth like cars or real estates) which are 
not offset by somebody else’s liability. 
 
2. “Inside wealth” versus “outside wealth” – in a closd economy,with only the private and 
public sector, the financial assets and liabilities issued by the private sector (“inside wealth”) 
necessarily cancelled each other. One household’s asset is another’s liability - they sum up to 
zero. For the private sector to accumulate financial wealth, it needs to be in a form of financial 
claims on the public sector  (“outside wealth”) – like governmental bonds. 
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According to Michał Kalecki: "(economics)it is the science of confusing stocks with flows. It is this confusion 
that has kept the Quantity Theory of Money alive until today. "cited by  Joan Robinson in Robinson J., 
"Shedding Darkness", Cambridge Journal of Economics, 6 (1982), 295–6. 
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 L. Randall Wray (2012): Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary 
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3. Net private financial wealth equals public debt – stock of private financial wealth by 
accounting identity must be equal to stock of public liabilities (i.e. public debt). The private 
sector is able to accumulate its financial claims on public sector only because annual flow of 
government liabilities (budget deficit) to the private sector is larger than the flow of private 
liabilities to the public sector. In other words, the private sector is spending less than its 
income.  The logical consequence of this accounting rule is that it is impossible for both the 
public and private sector to save (to run a surplus) simultaneously. 
 
4. The rest of the world’s debts are domestic financial assets – We can complicate our 
macroeconomic model by introducing the third sector – “The Rest of the world” (ROW then 
includes foreign households, governments, etc…). In this case it would be possible for the 
domestic private sector to accumulate the net financial wealth (by issuing the debt to ROW) 
even if the domestic governmental sector would run a balanced budget. 
 
The obvious conclusion that we can drive from the above macro accounting principles is that 
one sector’s deficit must be equal to another sector’s savings (i.e. its surplus). In our three-
sector-model the surpluses and deficits of each sector must necessarily cancel each other.
200
 :  
 
         Domestic Private Balance + Domestic Government Balance + Foreign Balance = 0 
                                                          
For more clarity we can divide each sector into sub-categories, but it will not change the main 
principle: 
 
       (Saving – Investment) + (Taxes – Government Purchases) + (Imports – Exports) = 0 
 
From the above identity it should be obvious that it is impossible for every sector to run a 
surplus at the same time. If one sector is saving, then at least one other sector will have to run 
a deficit. 
 
The following figure, that shows sector financial balances as a percentage of GDP, perfectly 
illustrates macro accounting principles discussed in this section :  
                                                          
200
 L. Randall Wray(2012): Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary 
Systems, Palgrave Macmillan 2013, p. 5 
   84 
 
 
 
 
Source: L. Randall Wray: Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary 
Systems, Palgrave Macmillan 2013, p. 29 
 
As we can see in this graph, deficit of any given sector has almost a perfect mirror image in 
form of the other sector’s surplus. The sum of all the surpluses and deficits will always net out 
to zero. 
 
2.2  THE NATURE OF MONEY 
 
One of the main theoretical contributions of MMT is to provide an alternative explanation 
about the origins, nature and the creation of money. Traditional economics textbooks give a 
functional definition of money, i.e. definition that attribute to money some functions and 
therefore responds to a question “what does money do?”. And so, arguments go, money 
functions as a medium of exchange (to buy goods and services), as a store of value, as a 
means of payment and finally – as a unit of account that can be used to measure prices, 
wealth, etc… 
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Proponents of MMT try to go beyond this standard interpretation and, by integrating the 
insights of Georg Friedrich Knapp and Alfred Mitchell Innes, they construct the theory of the 
nature of the modern money (therefore they try to respond to the question “what is money?”). 
 
Mainstream economists do not attribute to money any special role in their theoretical 
models
201
. Indeed, money functions only as a “neutral veil” over the real economic activities 
and therefore can only influence the nominal magnitudes (first of all inflation) but not real 
variables (like the level of output or unemployment)
202
.  Historically, money was introduced 
in order to temper the inconvenience of the barter exchange, and its value was based on the 
precious metals like gold or silver (the metalist approach to money discussed in the section 
1.1.1) 
 
In sharp contrast with this orthodox approach, the MMT economists claim that money is 
crucial to understanding the contemporary economic system. Following the work of Innes, 
MMT treat money as a form of credit, or more specifically, as a debt relation between two 
economic agents (“money express a social relation”203). In other words, money is a balance-
sheet operation in which “debt (promise or IOU204) is held as an asset by the creditor and as 
a liability by the debtor. The creation of money, then, is simply the balance sheet operation 
that records this social relation”205. Money is at the same time an asset (from a creditor’s 
point of view) and a liability (from a debtor’s point of view). 
 
A useful distinction needs to be made here between two different concepts: 
 
- “abstract money of account” (measuring unit) – a general, representative unit of 
account which is neither physical nor concrete.  Money of account is a numéraire  in 
which other goods, services and debts are measured (examples of money of account 
include US Dollar, Brazilian Real, British Pound, etc…) 
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 Lecture of Victoria Chick:  Why don't Economists understand money?, on Positive Money Conference in  
University College London,(January, 2013). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EObtwxpDSzk 
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 Louis-Philippe Rochon and Sergio Rossi, “Endogenous Money: the Evolutionary Versus Revolutionary Views,” 
Review of Keynesian Economics 1.2 (2013): 210–229. 
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 Foley, Duncan. 1989. "Money in Economic Activity." The New Palgrave: Money, edited by John Eatwell, 
Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman. New York and London: W.W. Norton, p. 519-525. 
204
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-  “money things” – are denominated in the abstract money of account. “Money things” 
are measured by the money of account.  They can have a physical form (coins, bank 
notes, etc…) or not (like electronic entries on the balance sheets in case of bank 
deposits)
206
. 
 
The money things are just part of the larger category of IOUs (“I Owe You”) that are 
recognised debts (liabilities). Everybody can issue the IOUs – individuals, households, banks, 
etc… The essence of the obligation of the issuer of each IOU is to “accept back its own IOU 
when it is presented”207. Otherwise it would mean that the issuer of IOU’s defaulted, because 
“refusing your own debt when submitted for payment is a default”208. 
 
The following example can illustrate how “money things” (and more broadly all IOU’s) are 
created. Person A borrows from person B one bottle of milk and recognises their debt by 
writing on a piece of paper : “I owe to B a bottle of milk. I will give it back to B in one 
month”. This recognition of debt is an IOU issued by person A. This document is an asset of 
B and a liability of A (creation of “money things” is a balance-sheet operation). If B 
presentsthat IOU to A in one month, A’s obligation will be to give a bottle of milk to B. If 
they refuse to accept their own IOU, they will default. 
 
Let us sum up this section with the following propositions that proponents of the MMT make 
about the nature of money
209
 : 
 
1. Contrary to the neoclassical theory, real world economy is not a quasi-barter system. The 
capitalist system is much more similar to what Keynes called “monetary production 
economy”, or to what Karl Marx called “general formula for capital”(M-C-M’). Money is at 
the same time the mean and the ultimate goal of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, 
the neoclassical barter paradigm needs to be rejected and money should be explicitly 
incorporated into the economic models. 
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2. Money is not a physical thing – it does not need any physical support (like gold for 
example). Money is an IOU – a recognition of debt. It constitutes, at the same time, a 
financial asset of its holder and financial liability of its issuer. 
 
3. Money-things are not equal. In fact, they represent “differing degrees of acceptability”210, 
and therefore we can organise them hierarchically - from the most acceptable till the least, 
depending on the issuer of given money things. I will develop the concept of the hierarchy of 
money in the next section. 
 
2.3 MONETARY SOVEREGIN GOVERNMENTS 
 
As we saw in the preceding section, IOUs are created when somebody is willing to accept 
somebody else’s debt. As Hyman Minsky noticed, money is not an exception - "everyone can 
create money; the problem is to get it accepted"
211
. Everybody can create a unit of account 
and then denominate liabilities in that unit of account but there is no guarantee that it will be 
accepted by other agents. 
 
From this point of view, governments hold a privileged position in comparison with 
individuals, households, private enterprises, etc… In contrast to other potential creators of 
money, governments can assure that there will always be a demand for money created by 
them. This can be achieved by  all the kinds of financial charges imposed by the state on its 
citizens. 
 
One of the most important theoretical insights of the MMT is the concept of the “Tax-driven 
money” (TDM) that explains why the money created by the state is so widely accepted:  
“(TDM) refers to the idea that the power of the State (or other political authority) to impose a 
tax (or similar) liability payable in its own currency is sufficient to create a demand for that 
currency and give it value”212.  
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 Foley, D. (1987) Money in economic activity, pp.519 – 25 in Eatwell, J., Milgate, M. and Newman, P. (eds), 
The New Palgrave: Money, New York and London, W.W. Norton 
211
 Minsky, Hyman P. 1986. Stabilizing An Unstable Economy. New Haven: Yale University Press, p.228 
212
 Forstater M. Tax-driven money: additional evidence from the history of economic thought, economic history 
and economic policy, (in:) Setterfield M. (ed.)  Complexity, Endogenous Money and Macroeconomic Theory: 
Essays in Honour of Basil J. Moore, Edward Elgar Pub(2006), p.203 
   88 
 
 
 
This rule applies only to the governments that are “monetary sovereign”, i.e. the ones that 
issue its own currency and have debts denominated in this currency. For instance, in the MMT 
approach the country members of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that adopted the 
same currency (EURO) are not monetary sovereign (the control over the money supply was 
transferred to the European Central Bank). Also, the countries with exchange rate policies of 
pegging the central bank's rate of exchange to another country's currency are not “monetary 
sovereign” in the MMT understanding. This is because such countries always need to 
accumulate huge amounts of foreign reserves (i.e. foreign currency) to maintain the peg. This 
in turn, considerably restrains the domestic policy space for governments. 
 
In the MMT approach there is a crucial difference between the issuer of the currency and the 
user of the currency. Monetary sovereign governments are the only issuers of the currency. 
All other agents, like households, private companies, members of the Eurozone and countries 
with pegged currencies are using the currency issued by the government
213
. The issuers of the 
currency (contrary to the users of the currency) are not revenue constrained – they can create 
money at will (“out of thin air”).  
 
According to MMT proponents, circulation of fiat money looks as follows: Every time when 
governments purchase some goods or services from the private sector – new money is created. 
By crediting banking accounts of the private sector, government “spends currency into 
existence”.214 Conversely, when the governments are debiting the bank accounts of the private 
sector (for example, when the taxes are being collected) money is destroyed. As we can see, 
the process of creation (and destruction of money) is simply a bookkeeping operation – no 
real resources (like gold for example) are involved. 
 
The analysis of the fiat money creation process, drives the MMT economists to the conclusion 
that monetary sovereign governments are not revenue constrained. In other words, such a 
government does not need to collect taxes or borrow any amount of money in order to spend. 
In fact, governments first need to spend (by crediting the private sector bank account) in order 
to later collect the taxes (by debiting the private sector bank account).   
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According to MMT economists taxes do not finance the public spending, but they do carry 
other important functions. First of all, they create a demand for a currency issued by the 
monetary sovereign governments. Secondly, taxes can be useful tools for achieving socially 
desirable goals, like redistribution of wealth through progressive taxation policies. Thirdly, 
taxes are used in order to balance the aggregate demand and aggregate supply, and therefore 
to constrain the inflationary pressures. 
 
Similarly, the monetary sovereign governments do not need to borrow money from the 
financial institutions by issuing the governmental bonds. According to the MMT proponents 
issuing of the bonds is just a monetary policy operation that helps the central bank to achieve 
the overnight interest rate target
215
. When there is too much excess of reserves in the banking 
system, the government can issue the bonds and sell them to private banks, and therefore 
drain the liquidity from the banking system. Private banks will always agree to buy those new 
bonds because they offer a better rate of return than the reserves. If, on the other hand, there is 
not enough reserves in the system, the central bank will buy governmental bonds from private 
banks (open market operations) and therefore will inject liquidity into the banking system.   
2.4 REAL CONSTRAINTS TO PUBLIC SPENDING 
 
The MMT explains how money is created in the modern fiat money economy. It concludes 
that monetary sovereign governments, that are the only issuers of the currency (other 
economic agents are users of the currency issued by the government), do not face any 
affordability constraints. In other words, those governments can afford to buy every good and 
service that is for sale in the currency that they issue. However, to say that government can 
afford to spend, does not imply that they should spend. In reality, the proponents of the MMT 
point out a number of factors that constrain government spending
216
. 
 
First of all, public spending faces the inflation constraints. One of the common 
misconceptions about the MMT concerns its supposed lack of concern with price stability. In 
fact, the MMT economists admit that public spending can induce the demand pull inflations. 
This can occur when the aggregate demand in a given economy exceeds the aggregate supply. 
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In other words, inflation will increase when the spending (public or private) exceeds the 
capacity of the real economy. This turning point is full employment of real resources and 
labour force:”inflation occurs when there is chronic excess demand relative to the real 
capacity of the economy to produce”217. If there are still some idle resources in the economy, 
inflation should not be a problem. In any case, the state can levy new taxes on its citizens and 
therefore tax away an excess demand.  
 
Secondly, public spending may, in some circumstances, increase the demand for imported 
goods and services, disrupt the trade balance, and, in consequence, put the downward pressure 
on the exchange rates. 
 
Thirdly, it is neither necessary, nor desirable for government to take up the responsibility for 
the whole economic activity. Therefore, in planning the sizes of its budget governments 
should take into account real capacities of the economy, because increased public spending 
can simply leave too few available real resources for the private sector.  
 
Lastly, governments are often constrained by budgeting procedures and debt limits. It is 
important to acknowledge, however, that a budget constraint is a legislative limit on the 
amount of national debt that can be issued by governments. In other words, government 
budget and the size of the budget deficit is a political choice, that can always be revised in a 
legislative procedure. 
 
3. POLICY FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT AND PRICE STABILITY 
 
In the first section of this chapter I presented an intellectual family tree of the Modern Money 
Theory. We saw that MMT is a very original synthesis of the very economic theories, like 
Functional Finance, Chartalism, the credit money theory and some insights of the Post-
Keynesian school. In the second section I dealt with some crucial concepts of MMT 
(descriptive component of the theory). In the following section I will present the normative 
component of the MMT, that is the most important policy recommendation of the MMT 
adherents – the employer of last resort (ELS) or the job guarantee(JG) program. 
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Proponents of the MMT claim that they adequately describe the reality of the modern 
monetary economies based on the fiat currency. The governments that are monetary sovereign 
play a crucial role in this system because they are the only producer of the currency. In other 
words, governments have a monopoly position in creation of the unit of account (Dollars, 
Pounds, Reals, etc…) and the money thing in which private companies and citizens can 
discharge their obligation towards the government (i.e. to pay taxes). 
  
In section 1.2 I was trying to show that this monopolistic position of the government as 
money creator (as defined above) assures that, contrary to other economic agents, they do not 
face affordability constraints. As Randall Wray put it himself: “(…)sovereign issuer only 
faces self-imposed constraints. These are human-made, not economic, rules. The market does 
not and cannot impose affordability constraints on government that issues its own 
currency”218. Monetary sovereign governments can always create new money – we saw 
earlier that the fiat money is created when the government spends i.e. credits the private 
accounts. Conversely, fiat money is destroyed when households and private companies pay 
their taxes, i.e. when governments debit the private accounts.    
 
The fact that governments are not revenue constrained means that they enjoy large fiscal 
policy space (they are limited by other factors, like inflation or self-imposed political 
constraints). Governments can afford to buy any kind of goods and services that are for sale in 
the national currency, simply because they can never run out of its own currency. This policy 
space assures that monetary sovereign governments can pursue, what MMT economist call a 
“public purpose” – a socially desirable goal, defined by society in democratic procedures. 
 
The MMT founders consider that fiscal and monetary policy of the state should be committed 
to achieving two such public purposes, namely full employment and price stability. 
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3.1 JOB GUARANTEE – EMPLOYER OF LAST RESORT 
 
The most important message of the MMT is that a monetary sovereign government with 
floating exchange rate can afford to buy everything that is for sale in the national currency. 
Given that the wage earners offer their services in the national currency, the government can 
afford to buy all idle labour force in the country, by offering a public sector job to anyone 
willing and able to work. 
 
The idea that government should provide a universal job program for its citizens has been 
called interchangeably in the MMT literature: Job Guarantee (JG), Public Service 
Employment (PSE), Buffer Stock Employment (BSE) or Employer of Last Resort (ELR). 
They all express the same idea, namely that government is able to provide full employment 
and price stability at the same time.  
 
The concept of Employer of Last Resort was developed by a Post-Keynesian economist 
Hyman Minsky and then successfully integrated into the MMT synthesis. According to 
Minsky the ELR program can create “an infinitely elastic demand for labor at a floor or 
minimum wage that does not depend upon long- and short-run profit expectation of business. 
Since only government can divorce the offering of employment from the profitability of hiring 
workers, the infinitely elastic demand for labor must be created by government”.219 
 
The main idea behind the program is very simple. Since capitalist economies are subject to 
periodic crises, they fail to achieve and maintain levels of full employment. Monetary 
sovereign governments can create enough public jobs to absorb all available labour supply. 
The JG/ELR program would not only eradicate the unemployment, but would also contain the 
inflationary pressure.  
 
In the form proposed by the MMT scholars, the JG/ELR program would have the following 
characteristics
220
: 
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1. JG/ELR Offers an Infinitely Elastic Demand for Labor: this means that the ELR/JG 
program would be operational independently of the business cycle phase. It would hire 
more workers during the depression and less during the expansion, but it would 
always be operational : every citizen independently of their work experience, race, 
age, or gender would be entitled to a JG/JLR job. It is obvious that private sector 
agents (users of the currency) cannot offer infinitely elastic demand for labor, and 
government (the user of the currency) needs to step in. 
 
2. JG/ELR Hires off the Bottom: although MMT is considered to be part of the “broad 
tent” of the Post-Keynesian school, its proponents reject the traditional Keynesian 
solution for the unemployment problem. The mainstream Post-Keynesian response for 
crises is well summed up by Paul Davidson : “Government fiscal policy is conceived 
as the balancing wheel, exogenously increasing aggregate demand whenever private 
sector spending falls short of a full employment level of effective demand and reducing 
demand if aggregate demand exceeds the full employment level”221. The MMT rejects 
this traditional Post-Keynesian policy recommendation, because general demand 
expansion does not address the counter-inflation directly and environmental 
concerns
222
. It also does not give a guarantee to create employment opportunities for 
the most disadvantaged members of the society and does not take into account the 
spatial labour market disparities
223
. As an alternative to this generalized Keynesian 
expansion, MMT propose the “bottom-up approach”, that is direct job creation by the 
government. Pavlina Tcherneva claims that JB/ELR programs would have an 
advantage of “creating employment safety-net to those individuals who tend to be 
hired last and fired first from private sector work — normally the least skilled and 
least educated”224, which would not be necessary a case in the traditional Keynesian 
“pump priming”. 
 
3. JG/ELR Operates as a Buffer Stock: During recession all the people laid-off from the 
private sector would immediately and unconditionally find a job in the JG/ELR 
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program. When the economy starts growing again, those people will search for jobs in 
the private sector that offers better wages. So JG/ELR would function as a kind of 
automatic stabiliser – government spending would increase automatically during the 
recession, and during the boom budget deficit would shrink.  
 
4. JG/ELR Pays a Fixed Living Wage: all the workers that cannot find employment in 
the private sector will be offered a wage level close to the existing minimum wage. 
Furthermore, the government will provide a package of  welfare benefits, such as 
healthcare, childcare, sick leave, vacation. One of the most important direct 
consequences of implementing the concept of job guarantee would be effective 
replacement of the minimum wage legislation with wage set in JG/ELR. This is 
evident, since workers could always change the private sector job offering low wages 
for the job in the JG/ELR program. 
 
5. JG/ELR Maintains and Enhances Human Capital: long-term unemployment has well 
known negative effects for the workers, mainly loss of skills and demoralisation. In 
consequence, the long-term unemployed become unemployable, even during the boom 
when the private sector is finally starting to hire. By offering a job to everybody who 
is ready, willing, and able to work, government assures a smooth transition from the 
JG/ELR program to the private sector. 
 
6. JG/ELR Employees Perform Valuable Work: MMT economists claim that there would 
always be enough meaningful opportunities to efficiently use the idle labour force. 
According to Wray, in designing the JG/ELR program we should take into account the 
potential impact on the private sector : “(…)we probably would want to undertake 
activities that are not currently undertaken by profit seeking firms, nor would we want 
to take job prospects away from the currently employed”225. Wray also gives an 
overview of the potential type of jobs that would be provided by government (which 
could be characterised as labour-intensive employment)
226
. 
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Some opponents of the MMT claim that JG/ELR workers would produce zero private 
market value. For instance, Sawyer points out that if the wage was higher than 
productivity in the JG/ELR program, then the ELR workers would make “net claims 
on the rest of the economy [and] that the net claims . . . are greater than those 
currently made by the unemployed”227. But as Billy Mitchell rightly pointed out, 
“(JG/ELR) workers would deliver positive contributions to the community (positive 
social value)”, meaning the goods and services that are not produced by the private 
sector but nevertheless are valuable for the society (for example safety monitors in 
schools surroundings)
228
. 
 
7. JG/ELR Operates with Loose Labor Markets: JG/ELR should not compete for the 
workforce with the private sector. As I mentioned earlier, it will operate as an 
automatic stabiliser, which means that the number of the employed workers will 
depend on the overall state of the economy. More workers would be employed during 
the slump, less when economy is expanding and the private sector is hiring again. This 
feature of the JG/ELR program poses some organisational problems: “JG jobs would 
have to be productive yet amenable to being created and destroyed in line with the 
movements of the private business cycle”229. This difficulty may be overcome by 
splitting the JG/ELR program into the core component “that represents the average 
buffer stock over the typical business cycle given government policy settings, the trend 
in private spending growth, and a mismatch of labour force characteristics and 
employer preferences”230) and a transitory component “that fluctuates around the core 
as private demand ebbs and flows”231. 
 
8. JG/ELR Is Financially Sustainable over the Long Run in Sovereign Currency Nations: 
In the second section of this chapter I tried to show that monetary sovereign 
government with floating exchange rates does not face affordability constraints. Such 
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a government does not need neither to collect the tax nor to borrow money (by issuing 
the bonds) in order to spend. So far as there are unemployed workers willing to work, 
the government can always afford to hire them. It is also worth noting that estimated 
costs of introducing the universal JG/ELR program in the United States would be 
under 1 % of GDP
232
. 
 
9. JG/ELR Is an Institutional Vehicle to Achieve Other Socioeconomic Goals: The main 
goal of the JG/ELR program is to provide full employment and price stability. But 
advocates of this solution claim that there would be additional advantages. Wray 
points out that the JG/ELR program would improve working conditions in the private 
sector. Just like in the case of the wage level (let us remember that wages fixed in 
JG/ELR become effectively the minimum wage), the working conditions
233
 provided 
in government-created jobs, would become “the minimum working condition”. The 
reason for this is simple – the private sector would have to offer working conditions at 
least as good as in JG/ELR. Otherwise workers would simply switch to a JB/ELR 
job
234
. Full employment would also eliminate, or at least considerably reduce, the 
informal sector
235
. Full employment would also reinforce the fight against the 
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, since unfairly treated workers would 
always have a possibility of working in the JG/ELR program
236
. Forstater and Pollin 
suggested that the JG/ELR program, combined with massive public investments, can 
take a form of the  Green New Deal and Green Jobs Corps
237
 
238
. 
 
3.2  PRICE STABILITY  
 
The MMT economists claim that monetary sovereign governments can afford to directly 
create jobs for all idle labour force in the country (JG/ELR program). Moreover, they claim 
                                                          
232
 Harvey, P. (1989), “Securing the Right to Employment: Social Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the 
United States”, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
233
 Paid vacations, work-life balance, rest periods, and work schedules, etc… 
234
 Wray, R. L. (2012) Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems, 
Palgrave Macmillan, p.223 
235
 Idem, p.223 
236
 Idem, p.223 
237
 Forstater, M. 2004. “Green Jobs: Addressing the Critical Issues Surrounding the Environment, Workplace and 
Employment.” International Journal of Environment, Workplace and Employment 1 (1): 53–61. 
238
 Pollin, R. (2012), “Back to Full Employment”, The MIT Press. 
   97 
 
 
 
that a properly designed full employment policy would not generate any inflationary 
pressures. 
 
As I already discussed  in the second chapter, the 1970s marked a clear rupture in 
governments’ attitude towards the unemployment problem. Virtually all governments of the 
industrialised countries abandoned their commitment to full employment. The role of the 
fiscal policies was  
downgraded and an absolute priority was given to monetary policies conducted by the 
independent central banks. 
 
Guided by the monetarist economic theory, central banks focused mainly on maintaining price 
stability, i.e. on keeping the inflation as low as possible. According to Mitchell and Muysken 
this new policy framework can be called inflation targeting, i.e. a situation where “central 
bank explicitly and publicly declares a target inflation (or price) quantum and changes short-
term interest rates to manipulate economic activity (and inflationary expectations) in order to 
maintain actual inflation within the pre-announced target, which may be represented by an 
acceptable range”239. This monetary policy is based on the concept of NAIRU (Non-
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) briefly discussed in the first chapter.  
 
The NAIRU concept refers to the idea that in every given economy there is some “natural 
level” of unemployment that is associated with stable prices – the inflation will accelerate if 
the unemployment rate falls below the NAIRU level. On the economic policy level this means 
that unemployment cannot be reduced by the monetary stimulus below the NAIRU level 
without increasing the level of inflation. In the NAIRU monetary policy framework “the 
unemployment pool is thus widely recognized and monitored as a price anchor, a primary 
concern for price stability in general, and a prime object of monetary policy“240. Just as Joan 
Robinson argued, in the modern capitalist economies idle labour constitutes an inflation 
control device.   
 
While it can be argued that NAIRU is an effective policy tool in maintaining the price 
stability, it also imposes considerable costs on the whole economy in terms of lost output and 
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unemployment. This is why the MMT economists strongly reject the NAIRU concept as a 
guide to macroeconomic policies and propose to replace it with Non-Accelerating Inflation 
Buffer Employment Ratio (NAIBER). 
 
The idea of the NAIBER was first introduced by William Mitchell and was inspired by the 
Wool Floor Price Scheme introduced by the Australian Government in 1970s. The main idea 
of the Australia’s wool price stabilisation program was to stabilise prices and incomes in the 
agricultural sector. The government was purchasing wool from farmers when the demand was 
low and selling it when the demand was high.  
 
According to Mitchell, the JG/ELR program would be organised along the similar lines
241
. 
The government would offer a floor wage for every adult person, able and willing to work. In 
other words, the government would buy the idle labour during recession for the JG/ELR 
wage. During the boom, when the labour demand of the private sector rises, the government 
sells the “labour stock” for any price above the JG/ELR wage.  
 
The MMT economists claim that maintenance of a variable buffer stock of jobs would be a 
more socially desirable inflation control tool than the current inflation-first policy of the 
central banks. Both NAIRU and NAIBER approaches are based on the idea of so-called 
inflation anchors and buffer stocks. Under the NAIRU regime inflation is controlled by a tight 
monetary policy of the central bank. The stocks of unemployed labour constitute the tool that 
keeps the discipline in the labour market and prevents excessive wage demands of the 
workers. In the NAIBER approach the pool of workers employed in the JG/ELR program 
constitute an inflation anchor. 
 
Mitchell defines the buffer employment ratio (BER) as ratio of Job Guarantee employment 
(JGE) to total employment (E) : 
 
BER = JGE/E 
 
He claims that the JG/ELR program has an in-built inflation control mechanism. During the 
recession rising BER would reduce the real wage demands. When economy is expanding and 
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the inflation is rising faster than it is desirable, the government can use tighter fiscal and 
monetary tools to increase the BER and, therefore, reduce the inflation. The BER that results 
in stable inflation Mitchell calls the Non-Accelerating-Inflation-Buffer Employment Ratio 
(NAIBER)
242
 : “(…) instead of a buffer stock of unemployed being used to discipline the 
distributional struggle, the JG policy achieves this via compositional shifts in employment”243. 
Every time when the inflationary pressure appears in private sector, labour is transferred to 
the JG/ELR sector. 
 
Mitchell also claims that NAIBER would not necessarily be higher than NAIRU, as some of 
the critics of the MMT claim
244
. The introduction of the JG/ELR would certainly increase the 
aggregate demand, but this would not result in accelerating inflation, since in demand 
constrained economies “firms are likely to increase capacity utilization to meet the higher 
sales volumes”245. Therefore, not only NAIBER is a more socially desirable inflation control 
tool, but also the buffer stock of employed in the JG/ELR program would be lower than the 
level of unemployment under the NAIRU regime. 
 
3.3 JOB GUARANTEE/EMPLOYER OF LAST RESORT PROGRAM IN PRACTICE 
 
Direct job creation by the state is not only a theoretical concept. Several countries 
implemented national employment creation schemes that can be considered rudimentary 
versions of the JG/ELR program. 
 
In 2004 the South African government launched the so-called Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP) with the aim to provide “an important avenue for labour absorption and 
income transfers to poor households in the short to medium-term. It is also a deliberate 
attempt by the public sector bodies to use expenditure on goods and services to create work 
opportunities for the unemployed”246. Workers in EPWP are employed in four main sectors: 
infrastructure (mostly labour-intensive maintenance programmes), the Non-State Sector 
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(subsidised jobs in Non-Profit Organisations), Environment And Culture Sector (which 
includes waste management, sustainable energy, etc..) and Social Sector (child care, crime 
prevention, etc…) 
 
Argentina created a job guarantee program called Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados 
(Program for the Unemployed Male and Female Heads of Households) in April 2002. The 
Jefes program provides a job for every head of a poor household, for minimum 20 hours per 
week with a right to at least 150 pesos (75% of the minimum wage). In order to register in the 
program there must be children under age 18, persons with handicaps, or a pregnant woman in 
the household. Generally, only one person from each household could participate in the 
program. The jobs proposed to workers consisted mostly of community services, small 
construction, maintenance activities and training programs
247
. Despite its limited range, the 
Jefes program proved to be a successful tool in diminishing unemployment (2 million new 
jobs created)
248
, reintegration of the workers into the formal labour market and boosting the 
aggregate demand
249
. 
 
The third example of a state funded job creation program comes from India. In 2005 the 
Indian Parliament passed the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) that 
guaranteed 100 days of employment per year to heads of poor households. Participants of the 
NREGA program are employed in labour - intensive rural public works projects such as: 
“field of environmental conservation and restoration, involving asset-creating public works 
such as watershed development, land regeneration, prevention of soil erosion, and restoration 
of tanks”250. The NRGA program is narrowly targeted, because only households from 200 
(out of 600) districts of India are allowed to participate in the program.  
 
All three programs presented in this section have some common components with the JG/ELR 
ideal. They consist of direct job creation by the government, all were implemented on the 
national scale and workers were employed in socially useful tasks. All three cases proved 
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themselves not only as useful tools in decreasing unemployment, but also as an institutional 
vehicle to achieve other socioeconomic goals (like poverty reduction and more gender 
equality)
251
. 
 
On the other hand, the Jefes, the NREGA and EPWP are partial employment programs and 
therefore they do not ”benefit from all the desirable ELR features”252. It is also difficult to 
draw any definitive conclusions about their effects on the price stability, since wages offered 
in this program do not provide an effective wage floor. In spite of these differences, in their 
comparison between the Argentina Jefes program and the JG/ELR ideal Tcherneva and Wray 
conclude that: “Jefes shows that a massive employment program can be implemented in 
relatively short time, which can be properly targeted to the intended population, which can be 
favorably received by its beneficiaries and which can perform useful activities that serve 
destitute communities”253.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the third chapter of my work I was trying to present a relatively new school of 
macroeconomic thought - the Modern Money Theory (MMT), also known as Modern 
Monetary Theory or Neo-Chartalism. Although the MMT is most often associated with the 
broad tent of Post Keynesianism, this is not a commonly accepted view. Indeed, some of the 
intellectual inspiration of the MMT school is older than the first publications of Keynes’s 
works.  
 
In the first section, we saw that the MMT is in reality a synthesis of different concepts and 
economic theories. From the works of Georg Friedrich Knapp, one of the most prominent 
members of the German Historical School, the MMT economists took the idea of “money as 
creature of the state”. Contrary to classical and neoclassical economists Knapp believed that 
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what gives money its value is not the precious metals, but the  law and the authority of the 
state that enforce its validity (“The State Theory of Money”).  
 
The MMT builds also on the insights of Alfred Mitchell-Innes – the founder of the credit 
theory of money. In Innes’s approach, the nature of money consists of credit (in other words a 
recognition of a debt) and in such a case, everybody can issue the money. The position of the 
state as the issuer of money is however different form other potential issuers of money. The 
state, contrary to other market participants (households, firms and banks), can create a 
demand for its money, by imposing tax liability on its citizens (concepts of “Tax-Driven-
Money”).  
 
The MMT school also embraces the Post-Keynesian and Schumpeterian theory of endogenous 
money creation, according to which commercial banks have a capacity of creating money 
“out of the thin air”. Money supply is endogenous in the sense that incentives to create new 
money come from within the private sector (its demand for credit), and not from the central 
bank. Finally, the MMT economists integrated Abba Lerner's concept of functional finance. 
The theory of functional finance rejects the idea of the “sound finance” and evaluates the 
government policies from the point of view of their effectiveness in achieving the 
macroeconomic goals. 
 
In this chapter I tried to show that it is possible to clearly distinguish the descriptive 
component of the MMT, from policy recommendations advocated by the MMT economists 
(i.e. the prescriptive part of the theory). 
 
The descriptive part of the MMT consists of a detailed explanation of functioning of 
contemporary monetary economies. The starting point of this analysis is the alternative 
understanding of the nature of money. In the MMT approach, the principal characteristic of 
what we commonly refer to as “money” is its credit (debt) character. Money is simply a 
recognition of a debt – a particular type of IOU’s. In such a case, everybody can “create” 
money, but as Hyman Minsky noticed, the problem is in getting it accepted by other market 
participants. 
 
From this point of view, the position of governments is however diametrically different. 
Governments can create a demand for money issued by them by imposing tax liabilities on its 
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citizens. Moreover, governments, can also name units of accounts (American Dollar, 
Brazilian Real, British Pound, etc…) and issue “money things” denominated in these units. 
Those government currencies are the only available possibility for the citizens to discharge 
themselves from the aforementioned tax liabilities. This assures that there will always be a 
demand for money created by the state.  
 
The money created by other agents has a smaller degree of acceptability than money created 
by governments. Since majority of private liabilities are not only denominated in 
government’s money, but are also convertible into government’s currency we can, after 
Randall Wray, illustrate the monetary system as a “pyramid of liabilities”. Indeed, there is a 
hierarchy among different kinds of money (those lower in the hierarchy are convertible to 
those higher in the hierarchy), and their position in this hierarchy depends on the  status of the 
issuer (bank, private firm, household, etc…). Once again the position of government is 
special, since every other kind of money is convertible into money issued by government (but 
not the other way around). 
 
From the fact that governments have a monopoly for issuing its currency we can conclude that 
government money has to be injected into the private sector by governmental spending 
(government spends money into existence). In practice governments spend by crediting bank 
reserves of the private sector agents, and tax them by debiting those reserves. Commercial 
banks play an intermediary role between government and the private sector.  
 
Using Wynne Godley’s sectoral balances analytical framework and simple macro accounting 
principles, the MMT economists came to surprising conclusions: net financial wealth equals 
public debt. In a two-sector model (private and public sector) it is impossible for both of them 
to run surpluses at the same time : deficit spending creates private financial wealth. This 
accounting relationship would not be fundamentally changed by including foreign balance 
(difference between import and export).  
 
This MMT insights into the mechanism of the modern monetary systems runs against some of 
the conventional wisdoms of the mainstream policies: the concept of a balanced budget 
approach and the ideology of “sound finance”. In the MMT view there is nothing wrong with 
deficit spending – in fact it is necessary in order for the private sector to grow. 
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This brings us to the most important conclusion of the MMT – monetary sovereign 
governments (i.e. governments that issue its own currency) with floating exchange rates, do 
not face the affordability constraints. Since those governments are the monopolist issuers of 
their currency they can afford to buy any goods and services that are for sale in this currency. 
In their spending decisions, the governments face other types of constraints: pressure on 
exchange rates, limits of resources, political (limits on the public deficit and public debt 
imposed by the law) and inflationary pressures. 
 
The policy recommendations of the MMT economists (the prescriptive part of the theory) are 
inspired by the Abba Lerner theory of functional finance and Hyman Minsky’s concept of 
“Employer of Last Resort”. In the MMT approach, since the governments can afford to buy 
everything that is for sale in the currency issued by those governments, they can also afford to 
buy idle labour. Therefore, MMT advocates the universal and public funded job creation 
program, called Employer of Last Resort or Job Guarantee.  
 
Monetary sovereign governments should use their fiscal and monetary prerogatives to achieve 
the most important macroeconomic goals: full employment and price stability. The JG/ELR 
program is a perfect tool to achieve both of them. By offering public sector jobs to anyone 
willing and able to work, the government can effectively eradicate unemployment and 
maintain the employment in the long run. By sustaining the buffer employment ratio,  the 
government can provide price stability without social costs generated by the NAIRU policies 
(i.e unemployment buffer stock). Additionally, it is an institutional vehicle to achieve other 
socioeconomic goals, like poverty reduction, reinforcement of labour laws and minimum 
wage legislation.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The question under discussion in this study was the possibility of achieving and maintaining 
the employment in capitalist economy. Persistent unemployment lies at the heart of economic 
malaise in vast majority of modern societies. It is a very complex socio-economic 
phenomenon that could be analysed on different levels. In my work I choose to investigate 
both political and economic aspects of unemployment. Accordingly, in succeeding chapters I 
dealt with the economic theory of labour markets, some political issues associated with 
unemployment and finally with the future perspective of full employment. 
 
What I have tried to show in the first chapter is that in economic sciences we can clearly 
distinguish two theoretical explanations of the phenomenon of unemployment. The classical 
theory of labour market builds on the insights of Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say and John 
Bates Clark and was synthesised in works of Arthur Pigou. According to this view, self-
equilibrating market forces will always guarantee that demand for labour is always balanced 
by the supply of labour. Therefore, markets will always clear – there will be no idle resources 
or idle labour. Existing unemployment is always caused by factors that disturb functioning of 
those market forces, like minimum wage legislation or trade unions collective agreement. 
Those external-to-market forces set wages on the level that prevents market from clearing.  
 
In the 1970s this explanation of unemployment was taken up by the modern mainstream 
economic theory. Just like their classical predecessors, neoclassical economists believe that 
the main cause of unemployment are the wage rigidities. Their economic policy prescriptions 
are, therefore, targeted at “freeing the markets” and removing all legislation that according to 
them impedes the functioning of the market forces. 
 
This (neo)classical view of labour market can be clearly distinguished from the 
(post)Keynesian theory of unemployment. For Keynes and his followers, capitalism is 
essentially a monetary economy. It means that money functions not only as an intermediary 
unit of account that facilitates the exchange of goods and services, but it has utility on its own. 
In periods of pessimistic expectations about possibility of profitable investments, money 
provides protection against uncertainty, in other words money is a store of value. Money and 
other liquid assets have zero elasticity of production, which means that labour from 
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commodity producing sectors cannot be simply redirected towards production of money (or 
other liquid assets). This means that when the demand for liquidity in economy rises, there 
will be not enough investments in private sector to assure full employment. Therefore, 
according to Keynes and his followers even with perfectly flexible wages, there would still be 
a possibility for involuntary unemployment. 
 
In the second chapter I investigated some political aspects of full employment. Firstly, I have 
presented Keynes’s economic policy recommendations that were adopted by most of the 
developed nations after World War II. Those included moderate income and wealth 
redistribution,  monetary policy (low interest rate and policy of cheap credit) and finally a 
fiscal policy. That third component included lowering taxes in recession and some kind of 
“socialisation of investment” by which Keynes meant countercyclical public investment. 
Increased public spending would offset the consequences of private sector liquidity 
preferences and resulting in involuntary unemployment. From the historical examples of 
usage of Keynesian fiscal policies recommendations in Japan, the USA and in various 
countries after the 2008 global Financial Crisis, we can conclude that they proved to be 
successful in stimulating economy and bringing back a near full employment level. 
 
Secondly, I tried to respond to the question why, in spite of their apparent success, Keynesian 
economic policies have been abandoned by most developed countries in the 1970s. While this 
is a very complex issue, it seems that the concept of political business cycle, developed by the 
Polish economist Michał Kalecki offers at least a partial response to this question. According 
to Kalecki (and Joan Robinson who later expanded Kalecki’s arguments), Keynes was 
absolutely right both in his explanation of the sources of involuntary unemployment and in his 
economic policy recommendations. For Kalecki, elimination of unemployment is entirely 
possible, provided that government follows Keynes’s prescriptions.  He claimed that real 
limits to full employment are not economical, but rather political: a government committed to 
full employment will necessarily face political opposition of the business community. Kalecki 
enumerated different reasons for this opposition, from which one seems to be particularly 
important. In capitalism, unemployment functions as a disciplinary device which allows the 
“captains of industry” to keep workers wage demands in check and therefore preserving the 
value of money. It also makes it possible for big business to carry out an “investment strike” - 
a refusal to invest in order to gain some favorable legislation from the government. In other 
words, full employment would completely change the balance of power between both 
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capitalists and workers, and between capitalists and the government. Those changes would be 
disadvantageous for the capitalist position in thesociety, so they will fervently oppose the 
policies directed at maintaining full employment.  
 
In the third chapter I discussed the development of a relatively new school of economic 
thought that could be considered as one of subgroups of the broad tent of Post Keynesianism 
– the Modern Money Theory. I tried to show that MMT was a very creative synthesis of 
different intellectual traditions, rather than something completely new. The main theoretical 
building block of the MMT includes Alfred Mitchell-Innes’s Credit Theory of Money, Georg 
Friedrich Knapp’s State Theory of Money, Abba Lerner’s Functional Finance, the Post 
Keynesian Theory of Endogenous Money, Hyman Minsky’s ELR/JG program and finally 
Wynne Godley’s sectoral financial balances approach. 
 
I argued that we can clearly distinguish the descriptive and normative components of the 
MMT. The descriptive part of the theory deals with the nature of money and explains how fiat 
money is created and destroyed in modern economies. In the MMT framework, there is a 
crucial distinction between issuers and users of the currency. The issuers of the currency, 
normally a government, can create money of account and then impose tax liabilities on its 
citizens. Then, the government issues a currency that is denominated in that money of 
account. This currency will be always accepted by its citizens since they need it in order to 
settle their tax liabilities with the government (concept of tax-driven money). We can 
conclude that the function of taxes is not to raise the revenues for public spending but to 
create a demand for the government money. 
 
Issuers of the currency create money by “spending it into existence”, that is by crediting the 
bank accounts of the private sector (and destroying the money by debiting those accounts). 
Monetarily sovereign governments do not need to raise money in taxes or to borrow it from 
the private sector. Therefore, contrary to users of the currency, issuers of the currency with 
floating exchange rates are always solvent, and can afford to buy anything for sale in their 
domestic unit of account. Monetarily sovereign governments do not face the affordability 
constraints, even though they face inflationary, political and exchange rate constraints. 
 
The most important economic policy recommendation of the MMT (its normative component) 
is Hyman Minsky’s concept of Employer of Last Resort or Job Guarantee program. 
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Amonetary sovereign government with floating exchange rates has enough fiscal and 
monetary policy space to serve the public purpose, that is to realise the goals defined by 
society in a political process. Two of such goals are of particular importance for MMT 
economists: full employment and price stability. Since monetary sovereign governments can 
afford everything for sale in their own currency, therefore they can also afford to buy labour 
power of people who cannot find employment in the private sector. In other words, it can 
eliminate unemployment and attain full employment. The ELR/JG program would also 
function as an inflation control mechanism : employment in the ELR/JG program would 
increase during recession and decrease during a boom when wage demands increase – the 
government could always use tighter fiscal and monetary tools to increase the pool of 
employed in the LER/JG program and therefore reduce the inflation. The national 
employment creation schemes from Argentina, India and South Africa discussed in the end of 
the chapter proved to be efficient in decreasing unemployment, and in achieving other public 
goals, even if they do not share all the features of the ELR/JG ideal advocated by the MMT 
economists.  
 
I conclude that the ELR/JG program (direct job creation by the government) advocated by the 
MMT economists provides a more efficient way to achieve full employment than the 
traditional Keynesian fiscal stimulus. It should be noticed, however, that MMT does not give 
direct solutions to the problem raised by Kalecki and Robinson, namely that opposition to the 
full employment is rather political, than economical. But it does provide theoretical 
framework in which full employment and price stability are not mutually exclusive goals, and 
by that, it debunks the most important argument raised by those who oppose the full 
employment. And that is the main contribution of the MMT – it undermines the intellectual 
justification of unemployment. But just as Kalecki pointed out, whether the full employment 
is maintained or not, it will be determined within the political sphere, and not in the academic 
discussion between MMT proponents and mainstream economists. 
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